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Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Why Private Parties Have Standing to Challenge an
Executive Order That Prohibits ICTS Transactions with Foreign Adversaries
Abstract
On May 15, 2019, President Donald Trump, invoking his constitutional executive and statutory emergency
powers, signed Executive Order 13,873, which prohibits U.S. persons from conducting information and
communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions with foreign adversaries. Though the
executive branch has refrained from publicly identifying countries or entities as foreign adversaries under
the Executive Order, observers agree that the Executive Order’s main targets are China and
telecommunications companies, namely Huawei, that threaten American national security and
competitiveness in the race to provide the lion’s share of critical infrastructure to support the world’s
growing 5G network.
Executive Order 13,873 raises several concerns—both broad and specifically related to the Trump
Administration. In general, courts have struggled to clearly define the legal status of executive orders or
the courts’ ability to review executive orders. The quasi-legislative nature of executive orders creates
tension with the separation of powers principle and contributes to courts’ challenges in addressing
concerns that they raise. The Trump Administration has continued a concerning trend of pursuing policy
objectives through executive orders rather than through Congress in the current era of legislative gridlock.
This Administration has also weaponized trade policy to accomplish national security objectives and
implement a protectionist strategy that threatens the U.S.’s position as the world’s leading economy.
This Comment argues that affected parties have standing to challenge the government’s enforcement of
this Executive Order against them in Article III courts in defense of their due process rights, despite
language in the Order that may suggest it is exempt from judicial review. By analogizing the new
interagency committee tasked with implementing Executive Order 13,873 to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, this Comment uses the precedent the D.C. Circuit established in Ralls
Corp. v. CFIUS to demonstrate that hypothetical U.S. person plaintiffs, who may be involved in ICTS
transactions with foreign adversaries, have a due process right to notice of, access to, and the
opportunity to rebut the unclassified information the government uses to justify enforcement action
against them under Executive Order 13,873. This Comment concludes by synthesizing the arguments of
important stakeholders who have submitted public comments on the proposed rule for enforcing the
Executive Order and providing policy recommendations to improve the efficacy and fairness of the
implementing regulations.
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ABSTRACT
On May 15, 2019, President Donald Trump, invoking his constitutional
executive and statutory emergency powers, signed Executive Order 13,873,
which prohibits U.S. persons from conducting information and communications
technology and services (ICTS) transactions with foreign adversaries. Though
the executive branch has refrained from publicly identifying countries or entities
as foreign adversaries under the Executive Order, observers agree that the
Executive Order’s main targets are China and telecommunications companies,
namely Huawei, that threaten American national security and competitiveness
in the race to provide the lion’s share of critical infrastructure to support the
world’s growing 5G network.
Executive Order 13,873 raises several concerns—both broad and specifically
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define the legal status of executive orders or the courts’ ability to review executive
orders. The quasi-legislative nature of executive orders creates tension with the
separation of powers principle and contributes to courts’ challenges in
addressing concerns that they raise. The Trump Administration has continued
a concerning trend of pursuing policy objectives through executive orders rather
than through Congress in the current era of legislative gridlock. This Administration
has also weaponized trade policy to accomplish national security objectives and
implement a protectionist strategy that threatens the U.S.’s position as the
world’s leading economy.
This Comment argues that affected parties have standing to challenge the
government’s enforcement of this Executive Order against them in Article III
courts in defense of their due process rights, despite language in the Order that
may suggest it is exempt from judicial review. By analogizing the new
interagency committee tasked with implementing Executive Order 13,873 to the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, this Comment uses the
precedent the D.C. Circuit established in Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS to demonstrate
that hypothetical U.S. person plaintiffs, who may be involved in ICTS transactions
with foreign adversaries, have a due process right to notice of, access to, and the
opportunity to rebut the unclassified information the government uses to justify
enforcement action against them under Executive Order 13,873. This Comment
concludes by synthesizing the arguments of important stakeholders who have
submitted public comments on the proposed rule for enforcing the Executive
Order and providing policy recommendations to improve the efficacy and
fairness of the implementing regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
“The example of such unlimited executive power that must have
most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George
III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence
leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his

1886

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1883

image.”1 Throughout the history of the United States, Presidents have
used executive orders to fill gaps in the Constitution’s allocation of
power and respond to pressing challenges that require greater agility
than the legislative process can achieve.2 As Justice Jackson noted
above, however, the Framers of the Constitution sought to avoid
creating an omnipotent executive—a desire embodied in the separation
of powers principle, which the Framers codified in 1789 when the
Constitution became the blueprint of the U.S. government.3 The
Framers rejected a form of government based on arbitrary, unchecked
power consolidated in the hands of the few and applied against the
many.4 Executive orders often contradict that ideal by empowering the
President with legislative, enforcement, and judicial authority to
address or resolve pertinent issues; thus, executive orders are
particularly prevalent and useful in times of legislative gridlock.5
On May 15, 2019, President Trump signed Executive Order
13,873—“Securing the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain”—in which he directed an interagency
committee, led by the Department of Commerce, to create a new
framework to assess United States persons’ or entities’ information and
communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions and
prohibit such transactions with foreign adversaries.6 Many key terms in
the Executive Order are defined ambiguously, and the Order lacks
guidance on the framework’s implementing regulations or the relevant

1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2. See Erica Newland, Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2031–32
(2015) (highlighting executive orders’ freedom from the constraints of some
legislative requirements).
3. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 641 (Jackson,
J., concurring).
4. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed . . . .”).
5. Cf. Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 552–53 (2005)
(“[Executive orders] rid the president of the need to assemble majorities in both
houses of Congress, or to wait through administrative processes . . . to initiate policy.”).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,873 § 1(a), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,689–90 (May 15, 2019).
The other members of the committee are the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland
Security, and the Treasury, as well as the Attorney General, the U.S. Trade
Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General
Services, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. Id. at 22,689.
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agencies’ roles in enforcement.7 The ambiguity of the Executive Order
creates the potential for arbitrary enforcement because it currently
does not feature procedural safeguards to stop any President, let alone
one as mercurial as President Trump, from labeling countries,
organizations, or individuals as “foreign adversaries” merely due to a
personal rift.
Data security breach liability is one nontraditional focus of national
security policy that Executive Order 13,873 may impact due to the
prevalence of third-party code, which media and e-commerce companies
use to control how they store data, interact with customers, and run
their websites and mobile applications.8 Companies worry that the
Executive Order’s application to third-party code may trigger the war
exclusion of their cyber insurance policies—which typically do not
cover loss or damage resulting from a state’s (or its agent’s) “hostile or
warlike action in time of peace or war,” regardless of its cause—and,
thus, result in a forfeiture of their coverage if cyberattacks on their

7. See id. § 2(c), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,690; Megan L. Brown et al., President Moves to
Restrict Foreign Telecom Deals Under Sweeping Order on Network Supply Chain Security;
Congress Poised to Follow, WILEY REIN LLP (May 16, 2019), https://www.wileyrein.
com/newsroom-articles-President-Moves-to-Restrict-Foreign-Telecom-Sales-UnderSweeping-Order-on-Network-Supply-Chain-Security-Congress-Poised-to-Follow.html
[https://perma.cc/S68H-F26X] (“This is a new area of regulation, separate from
existing government review of transactions by the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States, and there is uncertainty about how the order will affect business
until the agency makes rules as directed.”). At the time this Comment was printed, the
executive branch had yet to issue a final rule regarding the implementing regulations
for the Executive Order in light of public comments. Exec. Order No. 13,873 § 2(b),
84 Fed. Reg. 22,690.
8. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1573, 1585 (2011) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian
Shapiro ed. 2009)) (noting that, although establishing and operating the armed forces
are the primary concerns of national security policy, threats have emerged and will
continue to emerge from a variety of unforeseen sources); see also Daniel Garrie,
Executive Order 13873 Could Expand the Reach of War Exclusions in Cyber Policies, FORBES
TECH. COUNCIL (July 16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/20
19/07/16/executive-order-13873-could-expand-the-reach-of-war-exclusions-in-cyberpolicies/#321ae70575b3 [https://perma.cc/HEQ6-TBT2] (detailing Executive Order
13,873’s implications for cyber insurance litigation); New Executive Order Applies to
Foreign Third-Party Code, MEDIA TR. (Sept. 22, 2019), https://mediatrust.com/blog
/new-executive-order-applies-foreign-third-party-code [https://perma.cc/F43N-P33V]
(estimating that third-party code accounts for 80–95% of the code running on leading
media and e-commerce domains).
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systems occur.9 As foreign third-party coders account for many of the
increasingly prevalent malware attacks on U.S. digital infrastructure,
the Trump Administration will likely designate many third-party
coders, if not their host countries at large, as foreign adversaries.10
Thus, the new committee may enforce the Executive Order against
U.S. entities that use third-party coders’ services, despite the limited
oversight capabilities that U.S. entities possess over the third-party
coders with whom they work.11 The apparent breadth of the scope of
the term “foreign adversaries” in the Executive Order suggests that
insurance companies could deny coverage to U.S. companies that
sustain cyberattacks and receive third-party coding services from
private entities operating within the jurisdiction of foreign adversaries,
even if the interagency committee has not designated the third-party
coders themselves as foreign adversaries.12
This Comment argues that parties subject to Executive Order 13,873
have standing to bring as-applied challenges to the Executive Order in
Article III courts to assert their due process rights and preserve the
separation of powers principle the Constitution prescribes. Additionally,
this Comment uncovers the due process concerns that the Executive
Order poses for affected parties. While there is precedent for allowing
deliberate vagueness in executive orders concerning national security
and emergencies to provide the executive branch with sufficient
9. See Complaint at 4 ¶ 13, Mondelez Int’l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No.
2018L011008, 2018 WL 4941760 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2018) (providing an excerpt of
the insurance policy and war exclusion at issue in that case); Garrie, supra note 8;
MEDIA TR., supra note 8.
10. Garrie, supra note 8; MEDIA TR., supra note 8.
11. Garrie, supra note 8.
12. See Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,689 (May 15, 2019)
(identifying any person merely “subject to the jurisdiction . . . of foreign adversaries”
who acquires or uses ICTS in the United States as “an unusual and extraordinary
threat” to the United States); see also Securing the Information and Communications
Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,316, 65,317–18 (proposed
Nov. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“The Department [of Commerce]
invites comment on all aspects of the proposed regulation but notes that the
determination of a ‘foreign adversary’ for purposes of implementing the Executive
order is a matter of executive branch discretion and will be made by the Secretary in
consultation with [the other heads of the interagency committee’s constituent
agencies].”); Garrie, supra note 8 (noting that the broad scope of “foreign adversary”
in the Executive Order may provide persuasive authority to insurance companies,
which will argue that they no longer have to prove direct involvement of a given state
or its agent to invoke the war exclusion to deny coverage to victims of cyberattacks—a
historically difficult task).
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flexibility to respond to new threats as they emerge, Executive Order
13,873’s language does not clearly indicate the people or entities
subject to its enforcement.13 The Executive Order fails to confine the
scope of ambiguously defined critical terms, which may allow the
committee to deprive affected parties of their property interests
without providing adequate notice of the evidence the committee uses
to justify enforcement.14
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the separation of
powers principle; the history and legal status of executive orders; the
Trump Administration’s use of trade policy to serve national security
ends, as well as the specifics of Executive Order 13,873; the constitutional
and statutory authority on which President Trump substantiated this
Executive Order; existing legislation, regulations, and agencies that
operate at the intersection of national security and trade; and standing
to sue in Article III courts. Part II of this Comment then analyzes
standing in a hypothetical case of parties suffering a due process
violation as a result of this Executive Order’s enforcement and
compares the hypothetical claim with landmark standing cases to
establish that parties whom this Executive Order adversely affects have
justiciable due process claims against the executive branch.15 Part II

13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Newland, supra note 2, at
2036–37 (acknowledging courts’ tendency to defer to the President’s interpretations
of ambiguous provisions in executive orders).
14. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (explaining that
a valid due process claim arises when (1) the government deprives one of a life, liberty,
or property interest, and (2) in depriving that interest, the government violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
15. Infra Section II.A. The hypothetical claim involves two plaintiffs that illustrate
the wide variety of industries and actors that may fall within the Executive Order’s
scope: (1) a U.S.-based subsidiary of a foreign telecommunications provider, which a
foreign adversary allegedly controls, that is seeking to build critical infrastructure on
land the subsidiary recently purchased in the United States, and (2) a hospital that
uses a new, unique, “smart” cancer treatment machine, produced by a manufacturer
from a foreign adversary country, that identifies cancer cells in patients and
recommends treatment regimens using a broadband connection to solicit the advice
of leading oncologists around the world instantly. These plaintiffs argue that the
government violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides,
in relevant part, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The government infringes on the
affected parties’ due process rights when the government imposes mitigation measures
or blocking orders that deprive the affected parties of their property interests without
providing the affected parties with notice of, access to, and the opportunity to rebut
unclassified evidence the committee used against them in deciding to restrict the ICTS
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also advocates for lawful, fair, and effective enforcement of the Executive
Order through policy recommendations for its implementing
regulations. This Comment concludes that parties subject to Executive
Order 13,873 have standing to challenge its enforcement in Article III
courts on due process grounds, and that judicial review is a crucial
check on the executive branch’s power in support of transparency.
I. BACKGROUND
President Trump found statutory and constitutional authority for
Executive Order 13,873 in the National Emergencies Act16 (NEA),
International Emergency Economic Powers Act17 (IEEPA), 3 U.S.C.
§ 301,18 and Article II of the Constitution.19 To provide context to
evaluate the underlying authority for this Executive Order, this Part
first examines the separation of powers principle, the distinct
authorities each federal government branch possesses that are relevant
to this Executive Order, and how the branches share power during
national emergencies through congressional delegation of authority
by statute. Second, this Part discusses the history and legal status of
executive orders, examples of executive orders that have exceeded the
scope of the President’s authority, and the language of Executive
Order 13,873, specifically its insufficiently defined key terms. Third,
this Part evaluates existing legislation and executive action at the
intersection of national security and international trade and investment
to highlight how the government currently regulates the space. Fourth,
this Part explains the requirements for parties to achieve standing to
bring a claim in Article III courts and provides cases that have developed
the standing doctrine to frame the justiciability of this Executive
Order.

transactions in question. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States,
758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
16. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2012).
17. Id. §§ 1701–1707.
18. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) (authorizing the President to designate any agency head
or political appointee “to perform without approval, ratification, or other action by
the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any
function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or
subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President”). As this law is
purely administrative and unrelated to the quasi-legislative nature of executive orders
or intragovernmental power-sharing during national emergencies that concern this
Comment, this Comment does not discuss this law further.
19. U.S. CONST. art. II.
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A. The Balance of Power During National Emergencies
In the Constitution, the Framers granted distinct but sometimes
overlapping authority to each branch of government. This Section
focuses on the interaction between the branches when conducting
foreign affairs—first, through the separation of powers principle
broadly and, second, through emergency powers and statutes.
1.

Separation of powers generally
The legislative branch possesses all lawmaking power pertaining to
the specific issues that Article I of the Constitution identifies and can
take actions “necessary and proper” to fulfill Congress’s explicit
duties.20 The powers of appropriating funds, “regulat[ing] Commerce
with foreign Nations,” and declaring war are especially significant in
the national security and international trade contexts because they
represent limitations on the President’s role as the “sole organ” of
foreign relations in the federal government.21
The only congressional delegation of authority to the executive
branch explicitly mentioned in Article II concerns political appointments
and the conditional waiver of advice and consent.22 Article II suggests that
the President may occasionally share information with Congress—and,
under extraordinary circumstances, convene Congress—to urge
Members of Congress to take action on issues he deems “necessary and
expedient.”23 Although the President is the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, his ability to exercise authority in that capacity
largely depends on Congress’s funding of the military and declaring
war.24 Additionally, despite the President’s authority to make treaties
20. Id. art. I, §§ 1, 8.
21. Id. art. I, § 8; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936) (establishing the “sole organ” doctrine granting the President broad discretion
to conduct international relations with minimal congressional oversight or
involvement).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
23. Id. art. II, § 3; see, e.g., Alonzo L. Hamby, Harry S. Truman: Campaigns and
Elections, MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/truman/campaigns-andelections [https://perma.cc/CEG7-MG3E] (discussing how President Truman used
his authority to convene Congress into session ostensibly to enact his legislative
agenda, even though this was merely a political stunt to exploit the obstinacy and
inefficiency of Republican lawmakers in an election year).
24. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (illustrating the separation of powers principle in explaining that the
President cannot act as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces if Congress does
not appropriate funds to maintain the armed forces).
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and lead the government on foreign relations, Congress’s power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations highlights Congress’s role in
international trade.25 Presidents have found a basis for discretionary
executive authority, particularly in the context of national emergencies,
in the oath of office clause, and their duty to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”26
The “arising under” clause in Article III suggests that the federal
judicial power extends to almost all dispute resolution involving
federal law; however, the questionable legal status of executive orders
makes determining whether Article III courts have the power of
judicial review over them complicated.27 While executive orders are
not expressly “Laws of the United States,”28 the Supreme Court has
treated executive orders that derive authority from statutes as having
the “force and effect of law.”29 The Supreme Court has the power to
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional.30 Because executive orders
founded on congressional legislation have the “force and effect of
law,”31 the power of judicial review extends to executive orders as
applications of relevant acts of Congress.32 Moreover, Article III,
Section 2 notes that the judicial power applies “to Controversies to

25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2.
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3 (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”); see Glenn E.
Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive’s Crisis Powers with
the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1480 (1979) (suggesting that these
clauses implicitly grant the President the discretion to construe and refrain from
enforcing laws according to his good-faith effort to promote the “best interests of the
country”).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see infra Section I.B.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
29. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979) (describing when an
executive order has the “force and effect of law”); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 663, 674 (1981) (upholding Executive Orders issued pursuant to IEEPA
and the Trading with the Enemy Act).
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803)
(“[T]he particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.”).
31. Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 304.
32. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173–74 (grounding this power in the text of Article III,
Section 2).
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which the United States shall be a Party,”33 which could encompass
litigation stemming from the executive branch’s enforcement of executive
orders.34
2.

Emergency powers and statutes
As Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer35 and Dames & Moore v.
Regan36 indicate, Presidents often use executive orders to declare
national emergencies and invoke corresponding powers to bolster
their quasi-legislative action.37 Congress passed the primary emergency
statutes, the NEA and IEEPA, to clarify the requirements for and
limitations on congressional delegations of authority to the executive
branch during national emergencies, which vague constitutional
parameters and permissive common-law precedent previously governed.38
In practice, both laws’ oversight mechanisms have proven inadequate to
resist creeping executive discretion in declaring national emergencies
and acting during them.39 For the purposes of this Comment, the
discussion of the emergency powers and statutes will be confined to
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404, 2406 (2018) (addressing the
State of Hawaii’s claims that President Trump’s proclamation restricting entry into the
United States from certain foreign countries harmed the State as the operator of the
University of Hawaii system, “which recruits students and faculty from the designated
countries”). Thus, this constitutional provision is particularly useful for private litigants
trying to establish standing, given that courts generally do not interpret executive
orders to contain a private right of action. Newland, supra note 2, at 2076; see infra
Section I.D (providing a detailed overview of standing and the justiciability doctrine).
Scholars distinguish a private litigant’s ability to sue another private party for violating
an executive order from when a private party challenges the government’s
enforcement of an executive order, which, although seldom successful, courts are
more willing to review. John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private
Rights of Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 837, 837 (1981); see, e.g., Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of
Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that IEEPA does not give the
President the power to create federal court jurisdiction).
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
36. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
37. See infra Section I.B.2 for a detailed discussion of these cases.
38. See Fuller, supra note 26, at 1453–55 (detailing the events leading up to the
passage of the NEA); Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A
Congressional Attempt to Control Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1102
(1983) [hereinafter Harvard] (describing why Congress passed IEEPA).
39. See Fuller, supra note 26, at 1455–56 (explaining that the NEA’s statutory
loopholes prevent proper oversight of the President); Harvard, supra note 38, at 1104
(concluding that IEEPA does not significantly constrain presidential power compared
to prior legislation).
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their genesis, their impact on the separation of powers principle today,
and how their application to Executive Order 13,873 compares to
other situations where Presidents have used these laws as the
underlying statutory authority for similar executive orders.40
a. National Emergencies Act of 1976 (NEA)
Congress passed the NEA because of concerns that the Nixon
Administration was taking advantage of obscure legislation to use nonappropriated funds for alleged emergency purposes related to military
operations in Cambodia without sufficient oversight.41 The main
problem with emergency statutes, including the NEA, is that they give
the President broad leeway to declare a national emergency and almost
unbridled authority to act in any manner he deems appropriate during
that emergency to resolve the problem.42 The NEA sought to control
the President’s authority during a national emergency by requiring
him to publish the specific statutory authority he believes the government
must invoke to sufficiently address the emergency at hand.43 However,
Congress did not include firm requirements or determining factors to
guide the President when he considers declaring a national emergency
because some lawmakers did not want to impede the President’s ability
to swiftly respond to emergency situations.44 Furthermore, Congress
relinquished the opportunity to preempt spurious national emergencies
when it imposed few requirements on the President to declare national
emergencies under the NEA.45 Additionally, Congress has seldom

40. Infra Section I.C.1–2.
41. Fuller, supra note 26, at 1453–54 n.4 (quoting National Emergency: Hearings
Before the S. Spec. Comm. on the Termination of the National Emergency, 93d Cong. 502
(1973) (statement of Tom C. Clark, J. of the Supreme Court)) (second alteration in
original) (“[T]he emergency power now existing in the Executive is incalculable; and
the exertion of it in situations not intended with specific grants [of power] is
massive.”).
42. Id. at 1458 (“The test for when a national emergency exists is completely
subjective—anything the President says is a national emergency is a national
emergency.”); see, e.g., Patrick A. Thronson, Note, Toward Comprehensive Reform of
America’s Emergency Law Regime, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 786 (2013) (quoting Exec.
Order No. 13,405, 3 C.F.R. 231 (2006)) (raising a concern that classifying the
Belarusian government’s political repression and public corruption as an “unusual
and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States” risked rendering the term “national emergency” meaningless).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012); Fuller, supra note 26, at 1463.
44. Fuller, supra note 26, at 1464.
45. Id. at 1465.
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exercised its limited remaining authority to check the President’s
power after he has invoked the NEA to declare a national emergency.46
b. International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA)
Congress passed IEEPA primarily to curb the President’s previously
unbridled economic authority during peacetime emergencies.47
Nonetheless, Section 203 of IEEPA empowers the President to impose
controls on transactions involving foreign interests and foreign property
subject to U.S. jurisdiction.48 Executive Order 13,873’s language is very
similar to that of Section 203, but the Trump Administration has
extended its application to ICTS transactions.49 Similar to the NEA,
IEEPA does not contain a definition for “emergency” under the statute;
however, IEEPA does provide a few preconditions to exercising IEEPA
emergency powers: (1) there must be an “unusual and extraordinary
threat” to the U.S.’s national security, foreign policy, or economy that
stems primarily from outside the United States; (2) the President must
declare a national emergency in response to that threat; and (3) the
46. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (“Not later than six months after a national emergency
is declared, and not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such
emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint
resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.”); Fuller, supra
note 26, at 1470–71 (explaining that the concurring resolution is not only a
cumbersome, ineffective tool to check the President’s power, but it may even serve as
an unconstitutional congressional veto on the President’s role in the legislative
process); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1080
(2004) (noting that Congress has failed to fulfill its statutory duty as no vote has taken
place).
47. See Harvard, supra note 38, at 1102 (explaining that IEEPA restricted the
President’s power under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917).
48. Id. at 1106–07.
49. See id. (highlighting the President’s power to impose regulations on foreign
currency and banking transactions, as well as controls on foreign property that is
subject to U.S. jurisdiction). Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A) (2012) (authorizing
the President to control any foreign currency, credit, securities, or other banking
transaction “by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States”), and § 1702 (a)(1)(B) (giving the President broad power to
control any transaction involving foreign property that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction),
with Exec. Order No. 13,873 § 1(a)(i), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,689–90 (May 15, 2019)
(prohibiting “any acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use of
any information and communications technology or service (transaction) by any
person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . .
[where] the transaction involves information and communications technology or
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary”).
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President may only exercise the relevant IEEPA powers to address the
threat.50
B. The Legal Status of Executive Orders
Presidents’ power to issue executive orders mainly stems from Congress
delegating authority to the President via statute and the President
invoking his independent Article II authority.51 Presidents have used
executive orders to officially demarcate their positions on policy issues,
restructure the executive branch, and facilitate policy reform when
Congress is gridlocked.52
1.

Statutory checks on executive action exercised under executive orders
Executive orders are not subject to the legislative process, and the
President’s actions are not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
of 194653 (APA); thus, the President has extensive freedom to issue
executive orders without any procedural roadblocks.54 Nonetheless,
courts have held that executive orders possess the “force and effect of
law.”55 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., the Supreme Court concluded
that the President’s power is strongest when congressional authorization
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)–(b); Harvard, supra note 38, at 1115.
51. Newland, supra note 2, at 2030–31.
52. Id. at 2031; see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,781 § 1, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,959, 13,959
(Mar. 13, 2017) (directing the Office of Management and Budget to develop a plan to
reassign governmental functions and dissolve unnecessary agencies “to improve the
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the executive branch”); Exec. Order No.
13,767 § 2(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (announcing the Trump
Administration’s policy to build a physical wall to fortify the southern border of the
United States); Exec. Order No. 13,658 § 1, 79 Fed. Reg. 9851, 9851 (Feb. 12, 2014)
(setting a minimum wage for federal government contractors at $10.10 amid a
legislative logjam); see also Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the
Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014) (“[W]henever I can take steps without legislation to
expand opportunity for more American families, that’s what I’m going to do.”).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2018).
54. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) (finding that APA
provisions do not constrain the President); Newland, supra note 2, at 2031–32; Stack,
supra note 5, at 553 (“[G]enerally in the areas of foreign affairs and government
efficiency, there are no general procedural requirements for issuing executive orders
imposed [on the President] by statute.”). But see 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a), (c) (2012)
(requiring the President to publish executive orders in the Federal Register to ensure
the public has notice of prohibited conduct that could result in criminal penalties,
unless the United States is under attack or threat of attack).
55. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc. v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(determining that the executive order at issue commanded the “force and effect of
law” because Congress statutorily authorized the President to promulgate the order).
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and intent—ideally through an explicit delegation of authority in
legislation—support his actions.56 However, more recently, courts have
given the executive branch increasing deference to enforce executive
orders that confer power on the executive that the legislative branch
did not expressly delegate.57 Furthermore, some courts find that
executive orders generally do not create private rights of action.58
Additionally, courts sometimes find that they cannot review presidential
action stemming from a presidential directive, such as an executive
order, when the statutory authority underlying the directive granted
discretion to the President.59
Although the APA does not apply directly to the President, the law
may still constrain agency action pursuant to an executive order.60 The
APA stipulates rulemaking and adjudication procedures, as well as
standards for judicial review of final agency actions, for all executive
branch and independent agencies.61 The executive branch operates
under the presumption that Congress generally prefers judicial review
of administrative action, except where statutes granting the underlying
authority for the administrative action in question preclude judicial
review or where a law has allowed agency discretion in carrying out the

56. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
57. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 643 F.3d 975, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (implying that
a statute and an executive order signed with constitutional authority provided
exclusively to the President are equal in judicial stature).
58. See Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(refusing to expand the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), which defines the parameters of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, to civil actions arising from executive orders); see
also Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(explaining that any challenges to an executive order should be directed to the
executive branch, rather than the courts, as the issuing body and for the sake of
upholding the separation of powers principle).
59. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 & n.6 (1994).
60. Steven Ostrow, Note, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 666 (1987) (“[C]ourts
should look to the APA as an alternative basis for judicial review of an agency’s
violation of an order.”).
61. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2018); TODD GARVEY, CONG. RES. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (2017).

1898

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1883

administrative action.62 The APA permits plaintiffs to seek judicial
review of agency action that “adversely affect[s] or aggrieve[s]” them.63
To challenge the enforcement of an executive order under the APA in
court, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the challenged governmental
conduct constitutes ‘agency action’ within the meaning of the APA[;]
(2) that the action is final and that there is no other adequate court
remedy . . . [;] (3) that the plaintiff has standing to obtain judicial
relief”; (4) that the executive order has a “delegation of authority from
Congress,” indicating that the executive order has the “force and effect
of law”; and (5) that the “terms and purpose” of the executive order
suggest the President’s intent to create a private right of action.64
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,65 the
Court held that courts should generally defer to agencies’ interpretations
of the statutes that the agencies administer because agencies are more
familiar with the practical implications of various statutory interpretations
due to their subject-matter expertise.66 Additionally, the Court in
Chevron emphasized that agency deference promotes uniformity in the
law by preventing various courts from adopting different readings of the
same statute.67 However, courts have subsequently created exceptions to
Chevron deference, namely when the case concerns a constitutional
question.68 For example, the constitutional question exception would
apply if a court addressed the hypothetical case regarding the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that this Comment explores.69

62. § 701(a); see Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671
(1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)) (“Very rarely do statutes withhold
judicial review.”).
63. § 702.
64. Id.; Ostrow, supra note 60, at 664, 671; see Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz,
526 F.2d 228, 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1975).
65. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
66. Id. at 865–66.
67. See id.
68. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574–75 (1988) (holding that “where an
otherwise acceptable [agency] construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress”).
69. Infra Section II.A. As Chevron deference is not at issue in the hypothetical case
used to establish standing in a challenge against Executive Order 13,873 in the Analysis
Section, further discussion of the test to determine whether to apply Chevron deference
in a given case involving agency action is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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2.

Challenging executive orders in court
Very few executive orders have been completely overturned during
the tenure of the administration that issued them.70 The most iconic
example is President Harry S. Truman’s executive order to seize
American steel mills on national security grounds to keep them
operating during the Korean War and prevent a nationwide strike over
a wage dispute between the steelworkers and mill owners.71 Truman
issued Executive Order 10,340 based on his constitutional power as
President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, which he argued allowed him to authorize the Secretary of
Commerce to seize American steel mills after negotiations between the
union and mill owners collapsed.72 The Supreme Court found
Truman’s executive order unconstitutional because the President did
not have the authority to intervene in a labor dispute based solely on
his own constitutional power without congressional support through
its delegation of authority.73 Truman’s executive order also could not
fall under his power as Commander-in-Chief, which does not include
the authority to seize private property to resolve labor disputes and
force production to continue.74 Moreover, Truman’s executive order
was legislative in nature and, thus, beyond the President’s power to
advise Congress to make laws he supports or veto those with which he
disagrees.75
In 1947, Congress had previously declined to include an amendment
in the Taft-Hartley Act that would have permitted emergency
governmental seizures of companies during labor disputes to avoid work
stoppages.76 Given that Truman directly contradicted the will of
Congress and lacked adequate constitutional authority to act in this
70. See, e.g., Newland, supra note 2, at 2038 (highlighting that only 13 percent of a
sample of 150 cases pertaining to executive orders dealt with whether those executive
orders violated constitutional rights, and only one of those challenges succeeded in
proving a due process violation).
71. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(finding the executive order unconstitutional because President Truman had neither
a statutory delegation of authority from Congress nor sufficient constitutional power
to independently enforce the executive order); Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg.
3139 (Apr. 8, 1952) (providing President Truman’s reasons for ordering the steel mill
seizures and his alleged authority to execute them).
72. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. at 3139, 3141.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587–88.
74. Id. at 587.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 586.
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manner as President, the Court found no support for Truman’s attempt
to nullify Congress’s legislative power via executive order.77 In his
concurrence, Justice Jackson outlined a framework to assess the
strength and validity of presidential power relative to three degrees of
congressional support.78 Jackson’s framework continues to provide the
test through which courts analyze the President’s use of his emergency
powers.79
In Dames & Moore, the Court explained that a dearth of jurisprudence
regarding the general limits of executive power within the tripartite
system of government exists because the Court analyzes the particular
facts surrounding each application of executive power and challenges
to it on the narrowest possible grounds.80 In the wake of the Iran
hostage crisis in 1979, President Jimmy Carter declared a national
emergency and signed an executive order that froze all Iranian assets
subject to U.S. jurisdiction.81 The President subsequently prohibited
the courts from entering any judgments against Iran but authorized
select proceedings, including pre-judgment attachment.82 Dames &
Moore’s subsidiary earned a pre-judgment attachment against the
Atomic Energy Organization (AEO) for outstanding payment for partperformance when the AEO terminated the parties’ contract for the

77. See id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (classifying Truman’s authority in the
weakest category of presidential power because his actions contradicted the will of
Congress).
78. See id. at 635–38. Jackson identified three degrees of presidential authority
relative to congressional support for a given executive action: (1) “[w]hen the
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum”; (2) “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority”; and (3) “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id. at 635–37.
79. See Stack, supra note 5, at 557 (explaining that many courts still “reflexively”
rely on Justice Jackson’s framework to analyze the legitimacy of executive orders).
80. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660–62 (1981) (emphasizing that
separation-of-powers decisions do not establish sweeping precedent regarding the
overarching bounds of executive power because the judicial power is limited to
resolving specific issues, and the issues raised by the daily decisions of the executive
branch are so varied).
81. Id. at 662–63; Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919, 7919–20 (Jan. 19,
1981) (invoking presidential authority under the Constitution, IEEPA, and the NEA
to take this action).
82. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 663.
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subsidiary to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities.83 However, in exchange
for Iran’s release of American hostages on January 20, 1981, the United
States agreed to “terminate all litigation” between the two governments
or any of the countries’ nationals and resolve unsettled disputes via
binding arbitration.84 The district court granted Dames & Moore
summary judgment against the AEO, but the company could not
collect on its damages because of Presidents Carter’s and Reagan’s
executive orders, which forced the district court to vacate the
attachments pursuant to the U.S.-Iran agreement.85 Consequently,
Dames & Moore sued the President and Secretary of the Treasury to
enjoin them from enforcing these executive orders, which the
company argued exceeded the statutory and constitutional powers of
the executive branch.86 The Supreme Court rejected Dames & Moore’s
argument, explaining that IEEPA, the Hostage Act, and the
International Claims Settlement Act permitted the President to nullify
the attachment, settle claims through executive agreement, and
suspend unresolved claims.87 However, the President did not have the
power to suspend Americans’ litigation in American courts under the
Due Process Clause because the purpose of that litigation was merely
to assign liability and levy damages, neither of which concerned any
particular Iranian property within U.S. jurisdiction.88

83. Id. at 663–64.
84. Id. at 664–65.
85. Id. at 666; Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111, 14,111–12 (Feb. 24,
1981); Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. at 7919–20.
86. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 666–67.
87. See id. at 671, 673 (finding that IEEPA allows the President to invalidate the
exercising of any right pertaining to foreign property or that which is within U.S.
jurisdiction and to use frozen assets as a “bargaining chip” when negotiating with
adversaries); id. at 676 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2018)) (“[I]f the release [of a
hostage] so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such
means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain
or effectuate the release . . . .”); id. at 683 (quoting Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d
228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951)) (“The constitutional power of the President extends to the
settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government and the United States . . . .
The continued mutual amity between the nation and other powers again and again
depends upon a satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to
make such compromises has existed from the earliest times and been exercised by the
foreign offices of all civilized nations.”).
88. Id. at 675.
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3.

Executive Order 13,873 and the Trump Administration
The defense trade is often noted as the third arm of diplomacy,
along with the more traditional forms of relationships forged through
political and economic partnership.89 Accepting a realist philosophy of
international affairs, much of the United States’ post-World War II
clout has stemmed from the network of military equipment that connects
its allies around the world, provides them with a technological
advantage over their regional adversaries, and ensures their long-term
dependence on the United States for their own national security.90
Emerging technologies, like 5G infrastructure and artificial intelligence,
challenge traditional notions of security threats to the point where
trade policy predicated on national security is no longer the exception
to the rule.91
The weaponization of trade policy has been particularly prevalent in
the Trump Administration.92 President Trump has been quick to use
89. See U.S. Arms Sales and Defense Trade, BUREAU POL.-MIL. AFF. (May 21, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/u-s-arms-sales-and-defense-trade
[https://perma.cc/HA65ZWMF]; see also Defense Trade and Arms Transfers, DEF. SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,
https://www.dsca.mil/programs/defense-trade-and-arms-transfers
[https://perma.cc/WL4Z-UQBY] (defining the defense trade as “[t]he transfer of
defense articles and services [to international partners] via sale, lease or grant, in
furtherance of national security and foreign policy objectives”); Amy Ebitz, The Use of
Military Diplomacy in Great Power Competition: Lessons Learned from the Marshall Plan,
BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition
[https://perma.cc/S7J6-7ZD6] (noting that, despite a preference for “diplomacy in
the traditional sense of a State Department mission,” leveraging military prowess and
relationships has been a key feature of U.S. foreign policy since the Marshall Plan).
90. See BUREAU POL.-MIL. AFF., supra note 89 (referring to the economic and
operational efficiency gains the U.S. armed services and military-industrial complex
accrue through properly regulated defense trade).
91. Emerging Technology and National Security: Findings and Recommendations to
Develop and Deploy Advanced Technologies Through Effective Partnerships that Promote
Economic, Technological, and National Security Competitiveness, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (July
26, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_Emer
ging_Technology_and_National_Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE2F-D92B], 3–4
(urging the private sector to consider national security risks when making partnership
decisions for the sake of innovation and to collaborate on national security challenges
with the government).
92. See Brian Kingsley Krumm, Regulatory Policy in the Trump Era and Its Impact on
Innovation, 70 MERCER L. REV. 685, 701–03 (2019) (citing the Trump Administration’s
“America First” policies on foreign investments in American companies and
immigration as examples of actions that have increasingly isolated the United States
from the global economy).
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trade policy to accomplish non-economic goals and embellish national
security concerns to circumvent defense trade protocol and expedite
the supply of arms to controversial allies.93 This tactic presents a puzzling
conflict within an administration that ostensibly supports small government
and free markets but takes steps to significantly increase its surveillance
and market-control powers.94
Executive Order 13,873 aligns with President Trump’s protectionist
trade policies in the name of “America First,” as well as his trade war
with China.95 The following excerpt from the Executive Order provides
pertinent language to contextualize this Comment’s subsequent discussion
of the justiciability and policy issues surrounding the Executive Order.
The Executive Order prohibits:
any acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use
of any information and communications technology or service96
(transaction) by any person,97 or with respect to any property,
93. See, e.g., Marcia Robiou, What You Need to Know About Trump’s $8 Billion Saudi
Arms Deal, PBS FRONTLINE (July 16, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline
/article/saudi-arabia-arms-deal-trump-what-to-know [https://perma.cc/5SGS-KR3H]
(describing an arms deal with Saudi Arabia that President Trump authorized in the
face of vigorous congressional dissent and without clear support to justify the alleged
“emergency” action).
94. See Greg Bensinger & Reed Albergotti, Trump’s Huawei Sanctions Underscore U.S.
Dependency on China Tech, WASH. POST (May 16, 2019, 6:20 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/16/trumps-huawei-sanctionsunderscore-us-dependency-china-tech (“[The ban] will do significant economic harm to
the American companies with which Huawei does business, affect tens of thousands of
jobs, and disrupt the current collaboration and mutual trust that exist on the global
supply chain.”); Michael Grunwald, How Trump Could Shrink the Government (While Still
Keeping the Good Stuff), POLITICO (January/February 2017), https://www.politico.com
/magazine/story/2017/01/how-trump-could-shrink-the-government-while-stillkeeping-the-good-stuff-214679 (explaining the two-sided rhetoric that purports to
support small government while also promising big government reforms that will “take
care of the people”).
95. See Eric Geller, Trump Signs Order Setting Stage to Ban Huawei from U.S., POLITICO
(May 15, 2019, 7:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/15/trump-banhuawei-us-1042046 [https://perma.cc/WV68-YGMZ] (describing the Executive Order
as “the latest salvo in a broad campaign to combat what U.S. officials call China’s unfair
and disruptive practices”).
96. Exec. Order No. 13,873 § 3(c), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,691 (May 15, 2019)
(defining ICTS as “any hardware, software, or other product or service primarily
intended to fulfill or enable the function of information or data processing, storage,
retrieval, or communication by electronic means, including transmission, storage, and
display”).
97. See id. § 3(d), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,691 (defining a person as an “individual or
entity”); see also id. § 3(a), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,691 (defining an entity as “a partnership,
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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where the transaction
involves any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest (including through an interest in a contract
for the provision of the technology or service), where . . . the
Secretary of Commerce . . . , in consultation with [the heads of other
constituent agencies], has determined that[] (i) the transaction
involves information and communications technology or services
designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a
foreign adversary;98 and (ii) the transaction: (A) poses an undue risk
of sabotage to or subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of
information and communications technology or services in the
United States; (B) poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the
security or resiliency of United States critical infrastructure or the
digital economy of the United States; or (C) otherwise poses an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the
security and safety of United States persons.99

The broad scope of “foreign adversary” in Executive Order 13,873
suggests that the Trump Administration may be attempting to
combine more traditional national security nomenclature of “foreign
power” and “agent of a foreign power” into one term.100 In Section 6(c)
of the Executive Order, the President explicitly declares that the
Executive Order does not create a private right of action for any party
wishing to challenge its enforcement.101 Part II of this Comment argues
association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other
organization”); id. § 3(e), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,691 (defining a U.S. person as “any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any
person in the United States”).
98. Id. § 3(b), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,691 (defining a foreign adversary as “any foreign
government or foreign non-government person engaged in a long-term pattern or
serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United
States or security and safety of United States persons”).
99. Id. § 1(a)(i)–(ii)(C), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,691.
100. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2012) (defining a “foreign power” as a foreign
country, corporation or political organization “not substantially composed of United
States persons,” state-run corporation, international terrorist organization, or entity
“engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”); id.
§ 1801(b) (defining an “agent of a foreign power” as any non-U.S. person operating
on behalf of a foreign power in the United States or any person who “knowingly
engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities,” identity fraud, or
international terrorism on behalf of a foreign power).
101. Exec. Order No. 13,873, § 6(c), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,692.
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that this clause does not preclude parties’ ability to obtain Article III
standing to challenge the enforcement of this Executive Order on due
process grounds.102
C. Laws and Regulations at the Nexus of National Security and Trade
This Section highlights the major laws and regulations that govern
the intersection of national security and trade policy, as well as the
executive agencies that have played key enforcement roles in the space.
Additionally, the examples discussed below establish the foundation for
this Comment’s recommendations regarding the new framework’s
implementing regulations.
1.

Export control
The International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) is the main
export-control regime for conventional military technology, which is
classified on the United States Munitions List103 (USML). The seethrough rule for ITAR-controlled items, which are classified on the
USML, provides the U.S. government with permanent, geographically
limitless jurisdiction over all listed items and their components.104 This
system is simple, but it is inflexible and inherently inequitable because
it controls too much.105
The Export Administration Regulations106 (EAR) focus on dual-use
items, which have both civilian and military applications.107 The EAR
allow for control of end uses and end users, even if the law and list-based
regulation cannot keep current with emerging underlying technology.108

102. Infra Section II.A.
103. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(a)(2) (2018).
104. See Eric L. Hirschhorn, Under Sec’y for Indus. & Sec., Dep’t of Commerce,
Remarks at the 92nd Annual Conference for the American Association of Exporters
and Importers in Washington, DC (June 18, 2013) (“Under the ‘see-through rule,’ the
presence of a single, non-critical ITAR-controlled part, such as a switch or a bolt, will
render an entire foreign-made end product, such as an Airbus A-320 passenger
aircraft, subject to U.S. reexport controls.”).
105. Kevin J. Wolf, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Keynote Address
at the American University National Security Law Brief Symposium: The Evolution of
CFIUS & Export Controls: Law & Policy Pertaining to National Security (Apr. 18,
2019). For example, a special nut required for proper wing operation of Boeing civil
and military aircraft is listed on the USML and, thus, any repairs or replacements of
this benign but essential part require inefficient government approval. Id.
106. 15 C.F.R. § 730 (2020).
107. § 730.3.
108. § 732.3(h).
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Furthermore, the EAR are much more flexible than ITAR and feature a
de minimis rule when a see-through rule would be unnecessary and
cumbersome.109
On August 13, 2018, Congress enacted the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018110 (ECRA) as part of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019111 (NDAA). ECRA is the
permanent statutory authority for the EAR.112 ECRA requires the
Bureau of Industry and Security to collaborate with other agencies to
identify “‘emerging’ and ‘foundational’ technologies that are ‘essential
to the national security of the United States’” and apply the EAR
controls to them.113 ECRA allows for control of end use, end user, and
destination, rather than merely the list-based technology itself, which
might have non-threatening, non-military uses.114 Willfulness, for
which there must be proof of knowledge that one’s conduct was illegal,
is the mens rea for ECRA violations.115
2.

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
CFIUS is an interagency committee, led by the Secretary of the
Treasury and comprised of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland
Security, Commerce, and Energy; the Attorney General; the U.S. Trade
Representative; and the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy.116 CFIUS aims to both protect national security and

109. § 732.2(d)(1)–(3); Hirschhorn, supra note 104. Under the EAR’s de minimis
rule, the United States can lose jurisdiction if the technology in question does not
constitute a certain percentage of the end item. Id.
110. Pub. L. No. 115-232, §§ 1741–68, 132 Stat. 2208 (2018) (to be codified at 50
U.S.C. § 4801).
111. Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018).
112. See Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, The Export Control Reform Act of 2018
and Possible New Controls on Emerging and Foundational Technologies, INT’L TRADE ALERT
(Sept. 12, 2018), at 1, 2 (explaining that ECRA codified the patchwork of executive
orders and declarations issued under IEEPA that had previously kept the EAR in
effect).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3.
115. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 189–90 (1998) (stating that the
firearms statute at issue in the case is a specific intent statute requiring proof that the
defendant violated the statute with the knowledge that his actions were unlawful).
116. Resource Center: CFIUS Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.
treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-theunited-states-cfius/composition-of-cfius [https://perma.cc/M4MS-3FGP].
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allow desirable foreign investment into the United States.117 The key
factor in determining whether to restrict a given transaction is whether
a foreign entity has “control” over a U.S. company, demonstrated by
the ability to determine, direct, or decide an important matter at a
company.118 CFIUS may choose to review a transaction if it implicates
any of the factors on the following non-exhaustive list: technology
transfers, geographic proximity to military installations or government
facilities, critical infrastructure, or global supply chain.119 CFIUS is
primarily concerned with “front-door access” abuse120 of legitimate
means, such as international investment, used as a Trojan horse to
gather intelligence, conduct terrorism, threaten U.S. military supremacy,
or thwart counter-proliferation efforts.121

117. Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk in an Open
Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 9 HARV. NAT’L
SECURITY J. 1, 7 (2018); see also CFIUS Reform: Examining the Essential Elements: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 11 (2018)
[hereinafter CFIUS Reform] (statement of Scott Kupor, Managing Partner, Andreessen
Horowitz) (“If we make it harder for foreign investment to come into U.S.-domiciled
companies, that money will simply go to other countries that are more welcoming, and
we risk losing the leading competitive position in innovation that the United States has
long held.”). Losing the competitive edge in innovation is a major threat to U.S.
national security. CFIUS Reform, supra, at 9.
118. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 16.
119. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Securing the Nation or Entrenching the Board? The
Evolution of CFIUS Review of Corporate Acquisitions, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 643, 671, 680
(2019) (discussing the evolution of CFIUS review to consider both the defense and
economic implications of foreign investment in critical technology and
infrastructure); CFIUS’S PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT EXPANDED
JURISDICTION OVER REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 2, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Sept. 27,
2019), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2019/09/cfiuss
_proposed_regulations_to_implement_expanded_jurisdiction_over_real_estate_tran
sactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKK9-VKBW] (noting that CFIUS may review foreign
persons’ investments in real estate near sensitive U.S. government facilities for national
security reasons).
120. See CFIUS Reform, supra note 117, at 13, 35 (statements of Sen. John Cornyn,
Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs and James Mulvenon, General
Manager, Special Programs Division, SOS International) (discussing “straight
acquisitions” and “traditional acquisitions” of U.S. companies as means of front-door
access on which CFIUS, prior to the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), would primarily focus its review efforts).
121. See Harry Clark & Clark McFadden, Line of Sight: The US Government Is Planning
to Strengthen Oversight of Chinese Companies Involved in Technology Transactions with the US,
79 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 55, 55–57 (2019) (indicating that CFIUS is particularly interested
in imposing restrictions on the transfer of critical technology to China).
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CFIUS operates in secret and with limited transparency, as it does
not publish opinions or any reasoning; therefore, relevant nongovernment parties struggle to understand how CFIUS defines “control”
in each case.122 Likewise, the precise definition of “national security” is
unclear and frequently changes with the advent of dual-use, emerging
technologies and the transformation of economic integration into a
security threat.123 Furthermore, extensive experience with CFIUS
filings is the only way for non-government actors to find a trend
regarding the common obstacles to their transactions that are eligible
for CFIUS review because CFIUS does not provide filers with detailed,
post-determination reasoning that justifies enforcement action.124 The
core feature of a CFIUS filing is the joint voluntary notice (JVN), which
gives subject parties and CFIUS the opportunity to communicate about
a transaction under review.125 After the JVN process, CFIUS conducts a
risk assessment, which consists of threat, vulnerability, and consequence,

122. See Kevin Granville, CFIUS, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-iscfius.html (describing CFIUS review as the “ultimate regulatory bazooka”).
123. See Westbrook, supra note 119, at 665, 670 (“CFIUS operates in an environment
in which the economy, and many private commercial actors in the economy, are an
essential component of national security.”). As electronic and cyber warfare have
become increasingly prevalent in recent years, the executive branch has also
established “Team Telecom”—comprised of officials from the Departments of
Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense—to specifically oversee “foreign investments
in U.S. communications assets” and counsel the Federal Communications Commission
on licensing decisions and the conditions of foreign access to U.S. networks. Megan
Brown et al., Companies Will Feel the Weight of Team Telecom Oversight, LAW360 (June 4,
2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1049718/companies-will-feel-theweight-of-team-telecom-oversight.
124. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 8 (noting that the parties take a trialand-error approach to the CFIUS filing process). Despite the D.C. Circuit’s finding
that due process requires CFIUS to provide parties the opportunity to review and rebut
unclassified evidence that supported enforcement action, the government has broad
discretion to conceal certain unclassified information if it is tangential to national
security threats. See Christopher M. Fitzpatrick, Note, Where Ralls Went Wrong: CFIUS,
the Courts, and the Balance of Liberty and Security, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2016);
see also Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information
Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2004) (raising concerns over how the government
manipulates the classification process to cloak otherwise unclassified information).
125. JVNs consist of (1) a description of and rationale for the relevant transaction;
(2) relevant personally identifiable information (PII) and the parties involved; (3) the
foreign acquirer’s intentions with regard to the transaction in question; (4) a listing of
the foreign acquirer’s past CFIUS filings; and (5) a response from CFIUS with
questions and points of clarification. 31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (2018).
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to determine whether mitigation measures or outright blocking is
appropriate in a given situation.126
The lack of clarity surrounding CFIUS review is of particular
concern for small companies and startups, for whom the financial and
opportunity cost of retaining a law firm to navigate this process is
especially burdensome.127 Despite CFIUS’s lack of transparency, its
scope is much narrower than Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962128 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.129 Moreover,
entities subject to CFIUS review are quickly gaining a much clearer
sense of the boundaries regarding inappropriate investment in U.S.
companies, despite the enduring obscurity of CFIUS’s internal review
process itself.130

126. Threat refers to the nature of the relationship between the foreign entity in
question and the United States; vulnerability considers the features of a specific
transaction and companies involved that could be used to harm national security; and
consequence addresses the likelihood that the risk of harm will manifest, based on the
transaction, technology, or foreign entity’s capability to cause harm, as well as the
projected magnitude of that harm. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RES. SERV., RL33388,
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 10–11 (2020).
127. See CFIUS Reform, supra note 117, at 10; Scott Kupor, On CFIUS Reform:
Examining the Essential Elements, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 17, 2019),
https://a16z.com/2019/06/17/cfius-firrma-reform-policy-testimony-january-2018
[https://perma.cc/CEP6-SE8F] (arguing that forcing venture funds that possess
foreign limited partners to submit a CFIUS filing before every attempted startup
investment would be inefficient for CFIUS and the startups, which need capital to grow
quickly and take advantage of market opportunity).
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2018).
129. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2018); CONG. RES. SERV., R45148, U.S. TRADE POLICY PRIMER:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 41 (2019) (quoting § 1862) (explaining that Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act, known as the “National Security Clause,” allows the
President to “impose restrictions on imports that the Secretary of Commerce
determines are being imported in ‘such quantities or under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security’”); id. at 41 (showing that Presidents have
invoked the National Security Clause infrequently since 1963 (only twenty-eight times
in fifty-six years), while President Trump had done so twice in the first thirteen months
of his presidency); id. at 41–42 (highlighting Section 301’s significance as the primary
statutory provision that grants the President broad leeway in responding to “unfair”
trade practices, most recently to authorize the tariffs and trade war against China).
130. See, e.g., Letter from Aimen N. Mir, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Inv. Sec., Dep’t of
the Treasury, to Mark Plotkin, Covington & Burling LLP, and Theodore Kassinger,
O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Mar. 11, 2018) (on file with the Securities Exchange
Commission) (signifying that U.S. companies involved in microelectronics and big
data analytics are off-limits to foreign investors).
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The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988131 declared that courts could not review
presidential decisions to suspend or block deals.132 Despite this restriction
on judicial review, Ralls Corporation, a Chinese-owned company, sued
CFIUS to challenge CFIUS’s order compelling Ralls to postpone its
wind-farm construction on land near a U.S. Navy training facility in
Oregon, as well as President Barack Obama’s subsequent executive
order prohibiting the acquisition of the property altogether.133 The
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case because
the court did not believe it had jurisdiction to review either the CFIUS
order or the President’s veto.134 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) held that, although
Ralls could not challenge the President’s conclusion that the transaction
in question constituted a national security threat, Ralls could
legitimately challenge the President’s veto for violating the company’s
property interests by failing to comply with the Fifth Amendment’s due
process requirements.135
When the government deprives a party of its life, liberty, or property
interests, the government must provide the affected party with notice
of the official action, access to the unclassified supporting evidence,
and the opportunity to rebut that evidence to satisfy due process.136
The government failed to fulfill its due process requirements in
deciding to block Ralls’s acquisition of and construction on the subject
plot of land because the government did not provide any of the
unclassified evidence the President used to make his decision.137 Thus,
the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss Ralls’s
challenge to the President’s veto and remanded the case to the district
court to address the procedural due process question (separate from

131. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988).
132. § 5021(d), 102 Stat. at 1426; Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 21.
133. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 301–
02, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
134. Id. at 302.
135. Id. at 319–20.
136. Id. But see id. at 319 (clarifying that due process does not compel the
government to divulge classified information that supports official action); see also Nat’l
Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(emphasizing that classified information “is within the privilege and prerogative of the
executive, and we do not intend to compel a breach in the security which that branch
is charged to protect”).
137. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 319–20.
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any illegitimate challenge on national security grounds).138 The D.C.
Circuit also remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether CFIUS’s interim mitigation measures fell outside its authority
and deprived Ralls of due process because the mitigation measures
effectively prohibited the transaction—an action only within the
President’s authority.139 On August 13, 2018, Congress enacted the
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018140
(FIRRMA), broadening the scope of CFIUS review.141 FIRRMA created
a formal avenue for judicial review of CFIUS determinations by
requiring plaintiffs to file all legal challenges to CFIUS orders with the
D.C. Circuit.142
3.

Department of State
Department of State officers overseas enforce international agreements
pertaining to trade and investment.143 These Foreign Service Officers
collaborate with their counterparts stationed in Washington, D.C. to
identify foreign trade barriers that fail to comply with international trade
agreements.144 The drafters of Executive Order 13,873 and its implementing
regulations could refer to Executive Order 13,224, which includes the
factors the enforcing agencies consider when deciding to label an
individual or entity as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) or
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), and how that executive
order delegates authority to the relevant agencies.145 Executive Order

138. Id. at 325.
139. Id. at 322–23, 325. This issue remains unresolved because Ralls & CFIUS settled
before the district court had the opportunity to address this question on remand. July
2019: Legal Challenges to CFIUS Reviews, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP,
http://quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/article-july-2019-legal-challengesto-cfius-reviews [https://perma.cc/ZJJ3-NEQA] [hereinafter CFIUS Reviews].
140. Pub. L. No. 115-232, §§ 1701–28, 132 Stat. 2174 (2018).
141. See, e.g., CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139 (noting that, under FIRRMA, CFIUS may
review more transactions not traditionally associated with national security, such as
automobile imports).
142. § 1715, 132 Stat. at 2191–92; CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139.
143. INTERAGENCY TRADE ENF’T CTR., TRADE ENFORCEMENT: ISSUES, REMEDIES, AND
ROLES 47 (2015) [hereinafter TRADE ENFORCEMENT].
144. Id.
145. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786 (2001); Terrorism Designations FAQs, DEP’T
OF STATE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.state.gov/terrorism-designations-faqs
[https://perma.cc/JMW3-V4EG].
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13,224 aims to deter, disrupt, and raise public awareness about the
conduct that earns an individual or entity an FTO or SDGT label.146
Shortly after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed
Executive Order 13,224 to stem the flow of financial support to persons
or entities that intend to harm U.S. citizens and national security.147
The Departments of State and the Treasury are both responsible for
enforcement and designation, and do so in slightly different
circumstances.148 The Department of State designates certain entities
FTOs if they qualify as foreign organizations that engage in terrorist
activity.149 The Department of State marks individuals or entities as
SDGTs if they “have committed, or . . . pose a significant risk of
committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S.
nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States.”150 The Department of the Treasury can only designate
SDGTs and focuses primarily on identifying those individuals who are
either owned or controlled by an existing SDGT or “provide financial,
material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to
or in support of, such acts of terrorism.”151 Executive Order 13,224
features similarly vague, sweeping language and scope to Executive
Order 13,873, marking another example of the deliberate ambiguity
that has become the standard for executive orders related to national
security to imbue the enforcement agencies with sufficient flexibility
to respond to unusual and unforeseen, but covered, threats.152
4.

Department of the Treasury
In addition to collaborating with the Department of State to identify
SDGTs, the Department of the Treasury plays a “substantial role
regarding the negotiation, implementation, and enforcement of the

146. Executive Order 13224, DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/executive-order13224 [https://perma.cc/Y4ZK-Q2AV] [hereinafter Executive Order 13224].
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Terrorism Designations FAQs, supra note 145.
150. Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. at 787.
151. Id. § 1(c), (d)(i), 3 C.F.R. at 787; Terrorism Designations FAQs, supra note 145.
152. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,224 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. at 787, and § 1(d)(i), 3 C.F.R.
at 787, with Exec. Order No. 13,873 § 1(a)(i), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,690 (May 15,
2019) (“persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
a foreign adversary”), and § 1(a)(ii)(C) (“otherwise poses an unacceptable risk to the
national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States
persons”).
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financial services provisions of U.S. trade agreements.”153 In particular,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) enforces economic and
trade sanctions against foreign entities that pose risks to the economy,
foreign policy, or national security of the United States.154 For example,
OFAC freezes all SDGTs’ property and property interests in the United
States as part of its enforcement authority under Executive Order
13,224.155
D. Standing and the Justiciability Doctrine
The standing inquiry focuses on who can sue, while ripeness and
mootness govern when one can sue.156 To establish a court’s jurisdiction
to hear a case, a plaintiff must show injury-in-fact, causation, redressability,
and, if seeking injunctive relief, a non-probabilistic, “certainly
impending” injury.157 Article III, Section 2 “case” or “controversy”
language represents the closest textual support for this doctrine and
limits courts’ power by prohibiting the airing of abstract grievances in
the courts without showing the aforementioned factors.158 The standing
doctrine serves as a limitation on judicial review to prevent the courts
153. See TRADE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 143, at 50 (detailing the Department of
the Treasury’s role in eradicating foreign trade barriers and protecting domestic
industry).
154. About: Terrorism & Financial Intelligence: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/pages/office-of-foreign-assets-control.aspx
[https://perma.cc/B6YW-HW5Y].
155. Executive Order 13224, supra note 146.
156. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (emphasizing
that individualized harm is a cornerstone of standing jurisprudence in the United
States). As they raise separate issues from those directly pertaining to standing,
ripeness and mootness fall beyond the scope of this Comment.
157. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (stating that a
“threatened injury must be certainly impending,” rather than “objectively reasonabl[y]
likel[y],” to establish an injury-in-fact); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007)
(ruling that the case satisfied the redressability requirement because the EPA could
partially alleviate the harm the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its residents
suffered as a result of climate change); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (explaining that an
injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent); Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (indicating that there must be a logical
connection between the injury and the action of the opposing party to establish
causation).
158. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803)
(“The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
discretion.”).
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from encroaching on the executive branch’s discretionary enforcement
authority.159
Injury-in-fact is comprised of both a legal injury, which is one that is
cognizable under existing doctrine, and a factual injury, which shows
that the litigant before the court is the one suffering the injury.160 In
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,161 animal rights activists sued the thenSecretary of the Interior for restricting the geographic scope of the
Endangered Species Act to the United States and the high seas, thus
ceasing federal protection of wildlife in foreign countries.162 Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the activists did not have
standing because they lacked set plans to return abroad to study
endangered species and thus failed to indicate any actual or imminent
harm sustained as a result of the regulatory revision.163 The activists
proposed “nexus” theories, based on their individual stakes in a
collective interest, to support their standing.164 Although Justice Scalia
rejected these arguments as insufficiently particularized and too
attenuated, Justices Kennedy and Souter, who concurred in the
judgment, left open the possibility of a plausible application of these
nexuses in a more appropriate case.165 As Lujan exemplifies, “generalized
grievance[s]” that a certain class of plaintiffs widely share typically will
not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement because the legislative process
is a more appropriate forum to address policy issues than the courts.166
159. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170.
160. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining that the injury must be concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical).
161. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
162. Id. at 558–59.
163. Id. at 564.
164. See id. at 565–66 (describing the various nexuses: ecosystem, through which
“any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected by a
funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away”; animal,
through which “anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered
animals anywhere on the globe has standing;” and vocational, through which “anyone
with a professional interest in [endangered species] can sue”).
165. Id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986), in which the Court accepted the nexus
theory to decide that continued whale harvesting adversely affected the complaining
wildlife association’s members’ ability to watch and study whales and, thus, was an
injury-in-fact).
166. See id. at 575 (majority opinion) (providing examples of “generalized
grievance[s],” which cannot imbue the plaintiff with standing because they are not
unique, but rather shared by the entire public). But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 522 (2007) (justifying Massachusetts’s standing because of the significant amount
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To satisfy the causation prong of the standing test, the injury the
plaintiff alleges must have resulted from the enforcement of the
challenged government policy.167 The causal connection cannot be too
speculative.168 In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,169 a mother sued a district
attorney on equal protection grounds for declining to prosecute her
child’s alleged father for failing to pay child support because the state
statute did not require child support for “illegitimate” children.170 The
Court found that the mother lacked standing because she failed to
show a “logical nexus” between her inability to obtain child support
payments from the father and the district attorney’s decision not to
enforce the statute against him.171 Successful enforcement of the
statute against a parent who failed to make child support payments
would result in incarceration, not an injunction to make the required
payments.172 Furthermore, courts generally require plaintiffs to sue the
worst actor, whose actions caused the injury-in-fact.173 In Linda R.S., the
alleged father would have been the worst actor and a more appropriate
target of the mother’s complaint than the district attorney.174
Redressability implies that judges can provide some form of relief to
remedy the injury.175 In Massachusetts v. EPA,176 the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts sought to enjoin the EPA to exercise its enforcement
authority to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions, which Massachusetts
of coastal property the Commonwealth owned and the particularized injury it suffered
as a landowner).
167. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973).
168. See, e.g., id. at 618 (1973) (dismissing the petitioner’s case because it was too
speculative that she would have received child support payments from her child’s
father if the state had the same enforcement standards for legitimate and illegitimate
children).
169. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
170. Id. at 615–16.
171. Id. at 618.
172. Id.
173. See id.; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 (1984) (finding the Internal
Revenue Service was not the worst actor because its granting of tax-exempt status to
discriminatory private schools was not fairly traceable to black parents’ alleged injury
from those tax exemptions preventing their kids from attending racially integrated
schools).
174. See Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
175. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (deciding that enjoining
the EPA to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions via its enforcement powers would
redress Massachusetts’s injury associated with rising sea levels, despite the remote
nature of any future “catastrophic harm”).
176. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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claimed were causing sea-level rise that threatened its numerous
coastal communities and ecosystems.177 The Court concluded rising
sea levels resulting from greenhouse-gas emissions had already harmed
Massachusetts and would continue to do so without EPA intervention.178
Therefore, Massachusetts had standing to bring action against the EPA
because requiring the EPA to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions could
reverse the harm already done to some degree and mitigate future
harm even though the remedy could not eliminate the injury
entirely.179
To avoid asserting a merely probabilistic injury, a plaintiff must show
that the injury will likely occur again without judicial redress and that
the anticipated recurrence is neither speculative nor based on a
“highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”180 In Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA,181 Amnesty International claimed future harm
resulting from an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that the U.S.
government would monitor its communications with non-U.S. persons
at some point, pursuant to the government’s authority under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978182 (FISA).183 Amnesty
International also submitted the costs it incurred to keep its
communications with non-U.S. persons confidential as evidence of its
response to the risk of future harm.184 Amnesty International lacked
standing because its concerns of future harm were too speculative and
the organization could not “manufacture” standing by spending
money in anticipation of non-imminent harm.185
Third-party, or jus tertii, standing is an exception to the rule that
courts only adjudicate matters concerning litigants who are before the
court.186 To successfully assert third-party standing, the plaintiff
177. Id. at 505, 522–23.
178. Id. at 526.
179. Id. at 525–26.
180. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (quoting Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (explaining that the future injury must be
“certainly impending” to satisfy the injury-in-fact and non-probabilistic injury
requirements).
181. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
182. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012).
183. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401.
184. Id. at 402.
185. Id. at 402, 410; cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (emphasizing
that a plaintiff can receive an injunction to stop or compel the enforcement of the law
to redress the causally related injury if the plaintiff has an ongoing, forward-looking injury).
186. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193–94 (1976).
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generally must have a special—confidential or fiduciary—relationship,
such as doctor-patient or vendor-vendee, with the third party, who is
not before the court and whose rights the plaintiff is asserting.187 In
Craig v. Boren,188 the plaintiffs—a vendor and a male under the age of
twenty-one—challenged an Oklahoma statute that prohibited sales of
beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age
of eighteen, based on the assumption that males between the ages of
eighteen and twenty would be more likely to drink and drive than their
female counterparts.189 The Court found that the vendor could assert
third-party standing on behalf of her statutorily underage male
customers because the statute imposed a legal duty directly on her and,
thus, created a “concrete adverseness” between the vendor and the
statute’s enforcement.190 Furthermore, as a vendor with personal
standing, the vendor also had a right to litigate the associated rights of
third parties—her male customers between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one—who would sustain injury as a result of the failure of her
constitutional challenge and the continued enforcement of the statute.191
Taken together, the foregoing laws and jurisprudence related to
emergency powers, executive orders, national security and trade
policy, and standing support affected parties’ ability to challenge the
government’s enforcement of Executive Order 13,873 on due process
grounds. The next Part explains why challengers of the Order have
standing by applying existing, related precedents to two hypothetical
due process claims. Additionally, the aforementioned precedents and
agencies inspire the second Section of the Analysis, which concludes
by offering policy recommendations for the final rule that will set the
implementing regulations for Executive Order 13,873.
II. ANALYSIS
First, this Part uses the standing requirements to evaluate the
justiciability of two potential due process claims—one by a U.S.-based
but foreign-adversary-controlled telecommunications provider, and

187. See, e.g., id. at 193–95 (explaining that a vendor had third-party standing when
contesting a drinking-age regulation because her personal right to sue as a regulation
target allowed her to raise the rights of her adversely affected customers when her
claim failed).
188. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
189. Id. at 191–92, 200–01.
190. Id. at 194–95 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
191. Id. at 195.
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one by a U.S. hospital using a foreign adversary’s groundbreaking
cancer treatment machine—that the plaintiffs could bring against the
executive branch to challenge a decision to implement interim
mitigation measures or blocking orders pursuant to Executive Order
13,873.192 The hypothetical demonstrates the due process implications
that arise under this Executive Order for entities subject to its
enforcement, namely the ambiguity surrounding whether the
enforcing agencies will provide notice of, access to, and the
opportunity to rebut the evidence they will use to justify interim
mitigation measures or blocking orders.193 As legal analysts have noted,
this Executive Order aligns with the most recent NDAA, which
identifies the telecommunications industry as a major national security
risk because its constituent companies both build critical infrastructure
and provide services that enable the broadband technology on which
contemporary society depends.194 5G networks and the Internet of
Things will cause traditionally disconnected services, like healthcare, to
rely on the information and communications technology and services
(ICTS) supply chain and create more vulnerabilities for foreign
adversaries to exploit, despite optimizing those services by arming
them with exponentially faster access to exponentially more
information.195 This Part also explains why the separation of powers
principle and the APA indicate that the Framers and Congress would
advocate for judicial review of challenges to Executive Order 13,873.196
Second, this Part proposes policy recommendations for designing
the review framework and implementing regulations to effectively and
fairly enforce Executive Order 13,873, particularly focusing on facilitating
transparency and accountability with due process in mind.197 The policy
192. Infra Section II.A.1–4.
193. See, e.g., Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d
296, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining how the President violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment when he failed to provide Ralls with the unclassified
information that led him to block Ralls’s attempt to build a wind-farm near a naval
facility).
194. See Brown et al., supra note 7; see also National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 6306(b)–(c) (2019) (commanding the Director
of National Intelligence to form the “Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force” to facilitate information-sharing regarding those risks
between the government’s intelligence and acquisition agencies).
195. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF RISKS INTRODUCED
BY 5G ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 8–10 (2019).
196. Infra Section II.A.
197. Infra Section II.B.
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recommendations aim to clarify the key scope and enforcement provisions
of the Executive Order, as well as foster information-sharing between the
government and private sector, to preemptively resolve the due process
concerns the hypothetical claim raises.
A. The Separation of Powers Principle, APA, and Standing Doctrine All
Support Entities’ Ability to Challenge Unfavorable Decisions of Executive
Order 13,873’s Interagency Committee in Article III Courts on Due Process
Grounds.
The separation of powers principle exemplifies the Framers’ intent
to prioritize liberty over “efficiency.”198 The Framers strived to build
protections against authoritarianism into the Constitution as they
developed the structure of an “effective and accountable” American
government.199 While Article II grants the President the power to
gather Congress and implore the legislative branch to act to address
policy challenges he deems urgent, the Constitution does not expressly
grant an independent, quasi-legislative capacity to the President that
might have foreshadowed the advent of the executive order.200 The
198. See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that “the Framers ranked other values
higher than efficiency”); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . . .
to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”); Tara L. Branum, President or King? The
Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 75 (2002) (stating
that the Framers valued liberty above efficiency).
199. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)) (alteration in original) (“The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.”); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757–58 (1996)
(citation omitted) (“Deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule is not the sole reason
for dispersing the federal power among three branches, however . . . . Article I’s
precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting
procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative
lawmaking. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the prompt and
faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch
with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. The clear
assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be
called to answer for making . . . decisions essential to governance.”).
200. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Robert B. Cash, Note, Presidential Power: Use and
Enforcement of Executive Orders, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 44, 45 (1963) (noting that
executive orders were “administrative directive[s]” before World War II, but
subsequently became more legislative in character, namely with Truman’s executive
order to seize the steel mills).
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concept of executive orders and the President’s emergency powers has
emerged from an acceptance of the branches’ need to share overlapping
authority to optimize governance and from the ambiguous parameters
the Constitution established around certain situations.201
Some courts have found that the administrative recourse stipulated
in a given executive order is the exclusive enforcement method and,
thus, executive orders provide no private right of action in Article III
courts.202 Congress has occasionally entertained initiatives to reform
the use, scope, and justiciability of executive orders.203 Proposals include
statutorily extending standing to private individuals and institutional
representatives, as well as removing the President’s power to declare
national emergencies.204 FIRRMA’s delegation of a dedicated court for
judicial review of CFIUS determinations offers precedent for judicial
oversight in the executive branch’s trade and investment decision
making process.205 That provision only partially checks the executive

201. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (“I . . . give to the [Constitution’s] enumerated powers the scope and
elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications instead of the
rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism.”).
202. See, e.g., Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1967)
(finding no federal court jurisdiction where an executive order authorized
administrative relief); Ostrow, supra note 60, at 666 (depicting Farkas as an illustration
of the “formidable barriers” impeding a plaintiff’s ability to assert a cause of action
under an executive order). But see Freeman v. Shultz, 468 F.2d 120, 122 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (insinuating that a private party could seek injunctive relief related to the
enforcement of an executive order once that party exhausted its administrative
remedies); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 706 n.41 (1979) (suggesting
that a private party may seek judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies
when the administrative process cannot guarantee a reasonably timely resolution of
the party’s complaint).
203. See, e.g., Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 864, 107th Cong. (2001);
S. 1795, 106th Cong. (1999) (exemplifying bills that sought to reduce the President’s
reliance on executive orders, impose more requirements on the President before he
could issue executive orders, and facilitate judicial review of executive orders).
204. Congressional Limitation of Executive Orders: Hearing on H.R. 3131, H. Con. Res. 30
and H.R. 2655 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 32–34 (1999); see also Branum, supra note 198, at 85 (offering
suggestions of how legislation could curtail presidential discretion in emergencies,
including specifying the situations in which the President may declare a national
emergency and placing more rigid timelines and Congressional oversight on
emergencies and their continuation).
205. Supra Section I.D; see Pub. L. No. 115–232, § 1715(2), 132 Stat. 2191 (2018)
(designating the D.C. Circuit as the only court where parties may bring civil actions to
challenge CFIUS review determinations). But see Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at
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branch’s authority in conducting CFIUS reviews because concentrating
the burden to evaluate relevant challenges on one court will ultimately
limit such challenges due to efficiency burdens.206 Additionally,
although stipulating a specific court to review these complaints will
likely support the APA’s objectives to create a uniform interpretation
of the relevant law, it also risks transforming judicial review of CFIUS
determinations into a rubber-stamp process if affected parties have no
meaningful way to challenge the interpretations of the only court with
jurisdiction over these appeals.207
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., the Court sought to clarify the
boundaries limiting the President’s authority to act in a quasilegislative capacity.208 In that case, the Court invalidated President
Truman’s attempt to seize steel mills to preempt an imminent labor
strike via executive order and emergency power allegedly implied in
Article II of the Constitution.209 The Court found that not only did the
President lack the statutory authority to seize the steel mills, but the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act also showed that Congress had
flatly rejected such an application of executive power to resolve labor
disputes or other domestic economic crises.210 Neither the President’s
executive power outlined in the Constitution nor established by statute

37–38 (explaining that, despite creating a formal path to judicial review, FIRRMA has
actually made challenging CFIUS action more difficult by limiting valid claims to those
involving the violation of a constitutional right and exempting CFIUS’s actions,
determinations, penalty assessments, and any other use of its enforcement authorities,
as well as any APA claims). While the proposed rule noted that parties would have the
opportunity to formally oppose the Commerce Secretary’s preliminary determination
regarding a questioned transaction, the rule did not expressly identify an Article III
court where parties can sue for due process violations. Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,316, 65,317
(proposed Nov. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt 7). The proposed rule seemed
to suggest that the interagency committee would act as more than an adjunct to an
Article III court, which is an inappropriate usurpation of the judicial power. See Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 35 (1932) (“[A] party should not be deprived of the security of
a judicial hearing heretofore plainly provided for . . . .”).
206. See CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139 (indicating that potential challengers
adversely affected by CFIUS review have not exercised their right to appeal a CFIUS
decision in the D.C. Circuit since Ralls Corp.).
207. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 37–38 (highlighting that the legislative
intent behind FIRRMA was to restrict judicial review of CFIUS rulings to constitutional
injuries).
208. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
209. Id. at 585, 587.
210. Id. at 586.
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authorized him to seize the steel mills; thus, Executive Order 10,340
was unconstitutional.211
In the case of Executive Order 13,873, challengers likely would not
prevail on a facial attack on the Order because both an explicit
congressional delegation of authority to President Trump, as well as
his own executive powers, probably support it.212 Under the NEA and
IEEPA, Congress relinquished almost all of its decision making and
oversight authority during national emergencies to the President.213
Additionally, unlike the attempted steel mill seizures in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., which concerned a domestic issue under the guise of
a wartime national security threat, regulating ICTS transactions with
foreign adversaries inherently implicates an international problem
and the President’s Article II powers to control foreign affairs.214
Furthermore, since many internationally-focused emergencies and
presidential directives do not implicate “U.S. persons,” the prospects
of achieving standing for a facial, constitutional claim are slim as
constitutional protections do not extend to non-U.S. persons outside
U.S. jurisdiction.215 However, an entity within U.S. jurisdiction or
classified as a U.S. person that the government accuses of violating this
Executive Order would have standing to bring an as-applied challenge

211. Id. at 585, 587.
212. See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the combination of
executive power and the power Congress can delegate to him gives the President the
utmost authority to act).
213. Fuller, supra note 26, at 1455–56; Harvard, supra note 38, at 1104; see also
William Hebe, Comment, Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power, 17
VILL. L. REV. 688, 701 (1972) (crediting the expansion of presidential power to the
confluence of three factors: (1) Presidents’ “strong personalities,” (2) the emergencies
they faced (e.g., the Civil War, World Wars, and Great Depression), and (3) Congress’s
inability to quickly respond to these crises).
214. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 645
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to
sustain [the President’s] exclusive function to command the instruments of national
force, at least when turned against the outside world for the security of our society.
But, when it is turned inward . . . because of a lawful economic struggle between
industry and labor, it should have no such indulgence.”); see also United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (recognizing that only the
Constitution, not any act of Congress, delimits the President’s “exclusive power . . . as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“[A]liens [only] receive constitutional protections when they have come within the
territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country.”).
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based on a constitutional injury, such as a due process violation
resulting from the Executive Order’s enforcement without adequate
procedural safeguards, as well as an appropriate, workable remedy.216
These incremental challenges to this Executive Order would act as a
check on the executive branch’s power and allow the courts to ensure
the executive branch enforces this Executive Order appropriately
while the American people await congressional amendments that will
restore the separation of powers in the realm of national emergencies.
Affected parties could try to assert a constitutional injury-in-fact
based on due process because Executive Order 13,873 prohibits any
ICTS transaction between a U.S. person and “foreign adversary” that
threatens the U.S. economy, intellectual property, or national security
without ensuring that the government will share its unclassified
rationale for impeding such an ICTS transaction.217 Thus, the
executive branch will violate due process if it enforces the Executive
Order without adequate procedural safeguards pertaining to notice.218
To succeed in a due process claim, plaintiffs must show that the
government deprived them of their life, liberty, or property interests,
and that the government procedures depriving those interests do not
conform with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.219 Subject
entities—such as a U.S.-based subsidiary of a foreign telecommunications
provider, which the U.S. government suspects a foreign adversary
controls, seeking to build critical 5G infrastructure on recently
purchased land, or a hospital using a foreign adversary’s unique,
innovative telehealth machine to monitor the development of patients’
cancer and receive treatment suggestions—could challenge a final

216. See id. at 269 (reiterating that Fifth Amendment rights do not extend to nonU.S. persons beyond the “sovereign territory” of the United States); Ralls Corp. v.
Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(recognizing federal court jurisdiction over a due process challenge to CFIUS
enforcement action).
217. See Exec. Order 13,873 § 1(a), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,689–90 (May 15, 2019).
218. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) (providing the
components of a valid due process claim). Affected parties could include foreign
companies and their U.S. subsidiaries, such as Huawei; foreign countries, such as
China; or even individual investors, like a Saudi prince, whose attempts to exploit U.S.
ICTS are deemed economic or national security threats. Exec. Order 13,873 § 1(a), 84
Fed. Reg. at 22,689 (stating the Executive Order applies to “any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest”).
219. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 59.
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blocking order from the President on due process grounds, as Ralls
Corporation successfully did in its CFIUS review case.220
First, the telecommunications provider and the hospital would both
have valid property interests that the executive branch would deprive
them of when it enforces the Executive Order: the land and the
machine, respectively.221 Second, the procedural safeguards that the
Secretary of Commerce promises will accompany the government’s
enforcement of the Executive Order do not clearly ensure that subject
entities will have adequate notice of, access to, and the opportunity to
rebut the evidence against them in accordance with the Due Process
Clause.222 Thus, the hypothetical telecommunications provider and
hospital satisfy the threshold requirements for a due process claim.223
Since the settlement between Ralls and CFIUS preempted the district
court’s decision on the question of whether CFIUS’s mitigation
measures violate due process for “effectively prohibiting” a transaction,
which only the President may do, entities subject to the new framework
may also gain traction in the courts by challenging the new interagency
committee’s authority to impose mitigation measures in light of due

220. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 301–02 (insulating the President from substantive
challenges to his national security decisions but not procedural ones that implicate
constitutional rights).
221. Cf. id. at 315 (determining that Ralls’s acquisition of four U.S. wind farm
companies and their assets were valid state-law property interests, which thus qualified
for constitutional protection).
222. See Exec. Order 13,873 § 1(b), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,690 (authorizing the
Secretary of Commerce, along with the other heads of the committee’s constituent
agencies, to “design or negotiate” mitigation measures to address non-compliant
transactions without explicitly providing any safeguards to ensure due process); see also
Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply
Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,316, 65,321–22 (proposed Nov. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 7) (pledging to provide parties to a reviewed transaction written notice of
the Secretary’s final determination, which will detail whether he will prohibit, permit,
or, based on compliance with mitigation measures, conditionally permit that
transaction). The proposed rule mentions that the Secretary will send written copies
of his final determinations to affected parties and publish summaries of his final
determinations on the Department of Commerce website and in the Federal Register.
Id. at 65,322. However, the proposed rule provides no insight into the expected
content of these summaries or a process through which affected parties may rebut the
unclassified evidence supporting the Secretary’s final determination. See id.
Furthermore, the proposed rule does not discuss the potential for judicial review of
the Secretary’s final determination, which “shall constitute final agency action.” Id.
223. Cf. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 59 (declaring that deprivation of a valid
property interest without due process provides the basis for a due process claim).
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process.224 The following subsections evaluate the justiciability of a
hypothetical due process claim under a four-part standing analysis,
concluding that the telecommunications provider and hospital can
legitimately challenge the Executive Order’s enforcement as applied
to them individually in Article III courts.225
1.

Injury-in-fact
While a party would not have standing to dispute a President’s final
blocking order because of broad presidential discretion on national
security matters, a party has a valid claim for a due process violation if
the party did not have notice of, access to, or the opportunity to rebut
the unclassified evidence on which the President based his decision
before he blocked the transaction.226 Unlike the plaintiffs in Lujan,
who had neither plans to return abroad nor evidence that the new
regulations would render them unable to study elephants, the due
process violation here would be concrete and particularized because
the Executive Order would deprive both the telecommunications
provider and hospital of their property interests in the land and the
cancer machine, respectively.227 Additionally, the injury resulting from
224. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 322–23, 325; CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139; see also
Jonathan Wakely & Lindsay Windsor, Ralls on Remand: U.S. Investment Policy and the
Scope of CFIUS’ Authority, 48 INT’L LAW. 105, 106 (2014) (emphasizing the pressing need
for courts to clarify executive agencies’ authority to mitigate foreign investments
without corresponding presidential action because the transactions that CFIUS reviews
rarely require subsequent presidential action). But see CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139
(noting that a successful challenge to an executive agency or committee’s authority
does not bear on a President’s non-reviewable order prohibiting a deal).
225. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 828 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Review of the legality of Presidential action
can ordinarily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to
enforce the President’s directive . . . .”); Newland, supra note 2, at 2098 n.306 (“There
are no special bars to judicial review of the legality of an executive order . . . .”).
226. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 314.
227. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (laying out the
requirements for an injury-in-fact). The Ralls Corp. Court explained that the company
did not relinquish its property interest by choosing not to seek CFIUS’s approval
before the acquisition because CFIUS’s regulatory framework explicitly allows
companies to request CFIUS’s approval before or after a transaction. Ralls Corp., 758
F.3d at 317; Wakely & Windsor, supra note 224, at 109. Similarly, Executive Order
13,873 does not require private parties to seek the interagency committee’s preapproval of an ICTS transaction. See Exec. Order 13,873 § 1(b), 84 Fed. Reg. at 22,690
(noting only that the interagency committee can issue mitigation measures that “may
serve as a precondition to the approval of a transaction” that the Executive Order
would otherwise proscribe).
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the hypothetical due process violation would be actual or imminent
because the plaintiff lacked notice of, access to, and the opportunity
to rebut evidence the President used against the plaintiff to support a
blocking order as due process requires.228 A clause stating that the
Executive Order does not establish a private right of action against the
United States also seems to be a dubious denial of process.229
Furthermore, since no court has decided whether executive agencies
actually have the authority to impose interim mitigation measures,
affected parties could file suit to test this issue.230 Similar to the plaintiff
in Ralls Corp.—where CFIUS prohibited Ralls from building a wind
farm on land the company owned near a U.S. naval facility—the
telecommunications provider could point to the deprivation of its
property interests resulting from the interagency committee’s interim
mitigation measures, which would likely preclude the provider from
attempting to put its land to the provider’s desired use by laying
fiberoptic cable or building cell towers to provide underserved
communities with mobile phone and broadband access.231 The hospital’s
case is even more severe as the hospital could argue that mitigation
measures that effectively prohibit it from providing essential
healthcare to its patients deprive the patients of their liberty to make
personal health decisions or even of their lives if the patients die
because they lack necessary care.232 The hospital could play a similar
228. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 314 (providing the notice requirements that the
government must follow to avoid a due process violation when issuing mitigation
measures or blocking orders).
229. See id. at 311; Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 193–96 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(establishing that Congress must clearly intend to prohibit judicial review of
constitutional claims pertaining to administrative decisions in order to overcome the
presumption that plaintiffs may challenge constitutional violations in Art. III courts);
Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 620–22 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that broad statutory
bars to judicial review of certain decisions do not preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims that challenge the process by which the President reached those
decisions); cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675 (1981) (arguing that IEEPA
does not permit the executive branch to suspend Americans’ claims against foreign
adversaries in American courts because those claims are focused on assigning liability
and assessing damages, neither of which constitute transactions within IEEPA’s
scope—those involving particular property within a foreign adversary’s jurisdiction).
230. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
231. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 305, 319 (summarizing the use restriction that
CFIUS’s mitigation measures placed on Ralls’s land in Oregon and the corresponding
due process issue regarding the deprived property interest).
232. The Court has found liberty interests in situations unrelated to incarceration.
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a
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role to that of the vendor in Craig v. Boren, where the relevant statute’s
personal impact on her and her vendor-vendee relationship with her
customers allowed her to assert the rights of those customers against
whom the statute discriminated.233
2.

Causation
The causation prong is straightforward on the due process claim
because no investigation or subsequent mitigation measures regarding
an ICTS transaction with a foreign adversary would occur pursuant to
Executive Order 13,873 if the Executive Order did not exist.
Therefore, the affected parties would not have been deprived of notice
of, access to, or the opportunity to rebut evidence against them in the
government’s decision to restrict a given transaction if there was no
executive order to enforce.234 The hypothetical plaintiffs would not
struggle with the causation problem that the plaintiff mother faced in
Linda R.S., where the Court concluded that the government action it
could enjoin would not redress the mother’s injury because she failed
to sue the worst actor, her child’s biological father.235 Here, the
government would be before the court, its failure to provide notice
would have caused the due process violation, and a court could redress
the affected parties’ injury by enjoining the government to provide
that notice. Unclassified evidence that the interagency committee
could share with the hypothetical plaintiffs to avoid a due process
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262 n.8, 265 (1970) (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)) (interpreting welfare as both a
liberty interest because it sustains life and a property interest because society views
government entitlements as “essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of
charity” to their beneficiaries).
233. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194–95 (1976). Alternatively, trade associations
may attempt to assert third-party standing on behalf of entire industries in a class
action. However, courts are reluctant to give third parties standing unless they have a
special relationship with the people not before the court and the application of the
given law against the litigant will harm the rights of others not before the court. Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). Thus, courts would likely not grant
standing to trade associations or startup incubators on behalf of their membercompanies or founders because their ability to conduct ICTS transactions with
whomever they wish is not a fundamental right, and courts generally hold that
Congress is the proper forum to resolve widely-shared grievances. See id. at 575–76.
234. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 314.
235. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
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violation and help them comply with Executive Order 13,873 might
include explanations of why the government found the types of
information or technology that the plaintiffs shared with alleged foreign
adversaries threatened national security, or why the controls or
financing structures of the telecommunications provider and cancer
treatment machine’s manufacturer raised concerns.236
3.

Redressability
Injunctive relief against enforcement of the Executive Order, as well
as damages to compensate for any economic loss resulting from the
deprivation of the parties’ property interests, could redress the
hypothetical due process violation.237 Additionally, a court could order
the President and interagency committee to release any unclassified
information on which they based a blocking order or mitigation
measures.238 Similar to the relief in Ralls Corp., enjoining the President
and interagency committee to provide the utmost possible transparency
would cure the hypothetical due process violation by providing the
telecommunications provider and hospital with an opportunity to
rebut the evidence that led to unfavorable executive action against
them.239 Even though the remedy in these situations would only

236. Cf. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431 (1935) (holding that an executive
order that “contain[ed] no finding . . . [or] statement of the grounds of the
President’s action” violated the Due Process Clause).
237. See Stack, supra note 5, at 555 (explaining that private plaintiffs generally sue a
federal officer to enjoin an executive order’s enforcement when they want a court to
evaluate that executive order’s legality); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486
(1978) (suggesting that a private plaintiff may seek monetary damages for a
“compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest”).
238. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 320 (rejecting CFIUS’s argument that withholding
unclassified information pertaining to its review process served a “substantial interest
in national security”). Allowing the telecommunications provider or hospital to
resume their operations after modifying them to ensure they comport with the
Executive Order and its national security objectives would provide some relief to the
private entities. Id. This remedy would also mitigate the risk of recurring harm by
compelling increased government transparency, which would delineate the
boundaries of acceptable behavior and ICTS transactions under the Executive Order
for private entities. See Wakely & Windsor, supra note 224, at 106.
239. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 311 (confirming that the court could not review or
redress any injury directly resulting from the President’s order blocking Ralls’s
attempted acquisition and development of the property because of its national security
implications; however, the court could review a constitutional challenge to the process
that led to the President’s blocking order).
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partially redress the injury, the Supreme Court held that incomplete
redress was sufficient in Massachusetts v. EPA.240
4.

Certainly impending injury
If the hypothetical plaintiffs did not receive relief, the continued
enforcement of Executive Order 13,873 would result in further due
process violations as the plaintiffs would continue to lack both the
evidence on which the government based unfavorable decisions and
the necessary information to bring its operations into compliance with
the Executive Order.241 Unlike the Clapper and Lujan plaintiffs, whose
future injuries were not “certainly impending,” both of the hypothetical
plaintiffs’ businesses would suffer the effects of the due process
violation immediately because both businesses would have to cease all
pertinent operations without understanding potential ways to comply
with Executive Order 13,873.242 Thus, the hypothetical plaintiffs have
established an actual, concrete, particularized injury that is “fairly
traceable” to the enforcement of Executive Order 13,873, that the
courts can redress, and that is more than likely to continue harming
the plaintiffs without judicial intervention.243
In addition to the constitutional due process claim for which the
telecommunications provider and hospital have obtained standing, the
plaintiffs also have a cause of action under the APA to pursue judicial
review of final agency action through the government’s enforcement

240. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525–26 (2007) (acknowledging that
regulating greenhouse-gas emissions would not eliminate climate change, but that
such action would help to slow the rising sea levels that threatened the Massachusetts
coastline). Similarly, in the hospital example, the cancer treatment machine may not
cure patients’ diseases, but it certainly could abate some of their existing harm and
help prevent future harm to the patients.
241. See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 319–20 (underscoring the ongoing due process
violation stemming from Ralls’s inability to amend its proposal based on the
government’s evidence, which the company had not received).
242. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (vitiating the
plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing because a future injury based on a “speculative
chain of possibilities” is not “certainly impending”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 564 (1992) (finding no “certainly impending” injury to the plaintiffs because they
lacked concrete plans to return to Sri Lanka to study the endangered species that lost
protection as a result of the government’s decision to relax its overseas enforcement
of the Endangered Species Act).
243. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525–26; Lujan, 504
U.S. at 564; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
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of Executive Order 13,873.244 The hypothetical plaintiffs could show
that a blocking order or mitigation measures constitute final agency
action for which no alternative court remedy is available because the
Executive Order does not provide a path to appeal those decisions
within the executive branch.245 Furthermore, Congress delegated
authority to the President to implement the Executive Order through
the NEA and IEEPA.246 The final prong of a valid APA cause of action,
which requires a showing of presidential intent to establish a private
right of action through the text and purpose of the executive order,
creates a potential conflict for litigants as the courts disagree on
whether they have federal subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges
to executive orders.247 Although courts often decline to adjudicate
cases involving executive orders and explain that those grievances
should be addressed to the executive branch, the separation of powers
principle and Congress support Article III courts maintaining at least
appellate jurisdiction over executive order cases to ensure impartiality.248
244. See Ostrow, supra note 60, at 668–69 (citing Legal Aid Soc’y v. Brennan, 608
F.2d 1319, 1330 (9th Cir. 1979)) (acknowledging that courts presume judicial review
of administrative action without clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent
to preclude it, and explaining that courts doubt that presidential intent interpreted
from an executive order alone could preclude judicial review of agency action); see also
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 574–75 (1988) (identifying an exception to Chevron deference where a
constitutional question—such as the due process violation in the hypothetical claim—
is at issue).
245. See Ostrow, supra note 60, at 673 (“Agency action is ‘final’ for purposes of
judicial review when it is a definite statement of the agency’s position (rather than a
merely tentative or procedural decision) and when it possesses the status of law by
imposing obligations and by determining legal rights.”).
246. Exec. Order 13,873 § 2(a), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,690 (May 15, 2019).
247. See Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(excluding entirely civil actions stemming from executive orders from the scope of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350
F.2d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (rejecting appellate judicial review of challenged action
taken pursuant to an executive order because the executive branch is the more
appropriate body to handle such questions). But see supra note 244 and accompanying
text; see also Noyes, supra note 31, at 858, 862 n.101 (conceding that courts have
“routinely found” that they possess federal subject-matter jurisdiction over executive
order challenges when those executive orders derive their authority from congressional
legislation).
248. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Wakely & Indorf, supra note
117, at 38 (“While litigation concerning CFIUS has been very limited, the fact that the
Committee’s actions may be subject to review incentivizes the Committee to act in a
manner that comports with due process and is not arbitrary or capricious, in order to
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Despite some courts’ aversion to reviewing challenges to executive
orders, other courts have stated that the President does not have the
authority to declare that a private right of action does not exist
regarding a particular presidential action.249 Additionally, the APA
stipulates judicial review of agency action, except when the underlying
statutory authority precludes judicial review or the action is
“committed to agency discretion by law.”250 Because neither of those
exceptions applies here, the implementing regulations for Executive
Order 13,873 must include a provision that creates a path to judicial
review once the affected party has exhausted the available executive
branch remedies.251
Before FIRRMA, parties wishing to challenge CFIUS’s review decisions
lacked a clear opportunity to appeal outside the executive branch.252
As the Ralls Corp. decision shows, courts are better equipped than the
executive branch to resolve a constitutional question related to due
process that arises when the executive branch restricts business
conduct without providing adequate notice.253 Although the D.C.
avoid being hauled into court. Removing the prospect of judicial review would remove
one incentive for a Committee that already acts in secret to maintain high standards
of fairness.”).
249. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
250. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 212 (1945)) (clarifying that
the latter exception only applies when the legislature writes a statute so broadly that
“there is no law to apply” nor question for the courts to review); Ostrow, supra note 60,
at 668. Thus, courts interpret statutes to presume judicial review of agency action
when, as with the NEA and IEEPA here, statutes provide “standards, definitions, or
other grants of power [to] deny or require action in given situations or confine an
agency within limits as required by the Constitution.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 401
U.S. at 410; S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 212 (1945).
251. Despite the precedent of judicial deference to the executive branch during
national emergencies that the NEA and IEEPA govern, neither statute precludes
judicial review of action that an agency takes under the authority of either statute. See
Thomas J. McCarthy et al., Challenging Executive Actions Under IEEPA, NAT’L L.J. (June
2018), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/80382/Updated-NLJ-Reprint-IEEPA.pdf
(“IEEPA neither contains an independent right of judicial review nor imposes limits
on such review.”); see also Fuller, supra note 26, at 1498; Harvard, supra note 38, at 1113.
252. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1715(3), 132 Stat. 2174, 2191 (creating an official path to judicial review for
CFIUS orders).
253. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d 296,
312 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“We hardly think that, by reserving to itself such limited review
of presidential actions and critical technology assessments, the Congress intended to
abrogate the courts’ traditional role of policing governmental procedure for

1932

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1883

Circuit has not heard any similar appeals since FIRRMA became law,
affected parties’ knowledge that they can bring their challenges to a
neutral body serves as a check on executive power and may also foster
trust in the efficacy of this new transactional review process.254
Precedent indicates that courts prefer not to hear executive order
challenges and interfere with the executive branch’s domain; thus,
judicial decisions requiring the Trump Administration to provide
more unclassified information underpinning the enforcement of
Executive Order 13,873 would clarify its boundaries upfront, support
due process, and reduce litigation in the long term.255 The interagency
committee can learn from the successes and shortcomings of previous
security-trade regulations and strive for user-friendly implementing
regulations that support transparency in its new framework.256
B. Policy Recommendation for the New Framework and Its Implementation
Uncertainty beckons the death of trade.257 The new interagency
framework, which prohibits ICTS transactions with foreign adversaries,
could negatively impact trade and investment in the United States by
imposing unpredictable obstacles to trade and intruding into private
business at the will of the President, thereby fomenting uncertainty
and reluctance to participate in the U.S. economy.258 Trade policy is a
key diplomatic tool, but its integration with national security policy is
only appropriate in circumstances involving listed technologies or
those with a specific application that threatens U.S. national security.259
The interagency committee charged with developing this new
framework should emulate recent legislative and regulatory overhauls
at the trade-security nexus, which have resulted in increased clarity
regarding the scopes, targets, and enforcement methods of these
constitutional infirmity and perform that function itself.”); see also Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982) (clarifying that the courts may assess whether the
procedures of its coordinate branches “meet the essential standard of fairness under
the Due Process Clause,” even regarding issues “largely within the control of the
Executive and the Legislature”).
254. Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 38; CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139.
255. See Newland, supra note 2, at 2035 (“Perhaps our system [of government] is
better served by a jurisprudence that grounds each executive order in its respective
siloed, substantive area of law—for example, procurement, labor, or national security
law—rather than one that adopts a transsubstantive doctrine of executive orders.”).
256. Infra Section II.B.
257. See Wolf, supra note 105.
258. Supra Section I.C.
259. See Bensinger & Albergotti, supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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policies.260 These reforms will enable policymakers to promote
national security without neutralizing economic opportunities.
Executive Order 13,873 is primarily focused on managing global
supply chain risk and preventing China from obtaining critical
technologies directly or through third-party countries.261 The key
challenge is protecting what is truly sensitive to U.S. national security
without suppressing wanted economic activity.262 Striking that balance
may prove difficult in many cases involving emerging technologies,
such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, robotics, and 5G
infrastructure, where that cost-benefit analysis is equivocal. In the 5G
context, the U.S. government is fighting to ensure that neither the
domestic buildup nor that of the United States’ allies becomes dependent
on Chinese standards or technology.263 The scope of Executive Order
13,873 creates a massive opportunity for excessive government
intervention into private business, which will spur an onslaught of
litigation in response to the “intelligence bonanza” in the form of a list
of all suppliers to, investors in, or beneficiaries of foreign adversaries
that enforcement of this Executive Order will create.264 Clarifying the
limitations on foreign involvement in U.S. ICTS transactions for

260. Supra Part I.B.
261. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 7 (underscoring the threats that China’s role
in the technology sector poses to the United States and the various responses the
United States has taken to mitigate those risks, including tariffs, export bans, and
investment restrictions); cf. Brendan Catalano, Note, Balancing National Security Interests
Against the Value of Chinese Capital, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 293, 297 (2018) (footnotes
omitted) (“China is one of the five largest exporters of investment capital in the world,
and over the past ten years the value of Chinese capital in the United States has
increased by a factor of over one hundred. . . . [This has] creat[ed] jobs with wages
substantially higher than industry averages.”).
262. Catalano, supra note 261, at 297.
263. This is particularly challenging, given China’s immense leverage over the
global telecommunications market as both a supplier and customer. See, e.g., Cecilia
Kang, Huawei Ban Threatens Wireless Service in Rural Areas, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/technology/huawei-rural-wirelessservice.html (highlighting much of rural America’s dependency on Huawei to support
wireless carriers throughout “sprawling, sparsely populated regions” because its signaltransmitting equipment is significantly cheaper than its competitors’ offerings);
Raymond Zhong, Trump’s Latest Move Takes Straight Shot at Huawei’s Business, N.Y. TIMES
(May 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/technology/huawei-banpresident-trump.html (“Of the $70 billion that Huawei spent on components and
other supplies last year, $11 billion went to American companies . . . .”).
264. See Bensinger & Albergotti, supra note 94 (explaining legal consequences of
enforcing Executive Order 13,873).
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private entities through judicial review of blocking orders or mitigation
measures will imbue Executive Order 13,873’s new framework with
transparency and credibility, which are crucial to fostering investment
in the U.S. economy, without sacrificing national security.265
The concerns stemming from the addition of Huawei to the Bureau
of Industry and Security Entity List on May 16, 2019—as a quasicompanion regulation to the Executive Order in President Trump’s
ongoing trade war with China—highlight areas of needed clarification
that also apply to the new framework as the drafters finalize the
implementing regulations.266 Observers do not know how the
restrictions associated with the executive action will work in practice.267
Stakeholders disagree as to whether a chip designed mostly within the
United States would make it a U.S. product, even if it was manufactured
elsewhere.268 Uncertainty remains regarding the ways in which the
committee will manage transactions diverted to a foreign adversary
from a neutral party.269 Discussing the Trump Administration’s trade
and security policy, Kevin Wolf, a former Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration during the Obama Administration,
said: “In every other administration, the entity listing was purely a tool
of law enforcement and national security . . . . The thing to watch is
whether this will become a tool of trade policy and used as leverage in
the negotiations.”270 The interagency committee must design a
framework and implementing regulations that do not exceed executive
powers or impinge upon the rights of private parties.271
1. Use ECRA as an example for a clear, but flexible statutory scheme to
respond to unforeseen and unique situations as they emerge.
A leading cause of the decline of American innovation is the
burdensome regulatory regime, which President Trump has exacerbated
265. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 5.
266. 15 C.F.R. pt. 744 (2019).
267. See, e.g., Bensinger & Albergotti, supra note 94 (noting companies’ confusion
regarding whether they could still sell Huawei chips designed in the United States but
manufactured elsewhere and how this ambiguity has caused some companies to cut
ties with potential customers on the Entity List).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Zhong, supra note 263.
271. See Brown et al., supra note 7 (discussing subject matter the regulations are
likely to cover, including a list of foreign adversaries and their subjects, as well as
potential transaction or technology criteria that would trigger categorical inclusion in
or exclusion from the Executive Order’s prohibitions).
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with protectionist measures despite his overarching deregulatory
tack.272 Just as understanding “control” is essential to participating in
the CFIUS review process, enforcing the new framework will require
the Committee to peel back the layers in individual supply and
investment chains to understand who has actual control over affected
parties.273 The interagency structure reflects the Administration’s focus
on information-sharing and expanding access to non-public information
at least among different executive agencies.274 However, the lack of an
explicit process requiring the Committee to share the information on
which the Committee bases its decision to impose mitigation measures
raises due process concerns because the Committee deprives affected
parties of their property interests without providing notice of, access
to, or the opportunity to rebut the unclassified information
undergirding the property infringement.275 The threat of judicial
review and Article III standing might incentivize the government to be
more proactive and forthcoming with its rationale for issuing mitigation
measures or blocking orders for certain ICTS transactions, thus
bolstering public-private communication.276 In situations where
litigation is necessary, courts can clarify the meaning of core terms of
Executive Order 13,873 through common law precedent to help
private entities understand how to comply with the Executive Order
and protect private parties’ due process rights by ensuring appropriate
enforcement safeguards exist.277
While clear definitions and qualifications for terms of art are crucial
for effective enforcement of and compliance with Executive Order

272. Krumm, supra note 92, at 701–03 (arguing that using executive power to block
foreign investment through an expansive, protectionist application of CFIUS review
has contributed to decreasing innovation in the United States).
273. For example, an individual may only be a passive investor but may also have
access to foundational technology and, thus, could pose a national security threat. See
supra note 218 and accompanying text.
274. See CFIUS Reviews, supra note 139 (describing interagency structure of CFIUS
in greater detail).
275. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d 296,
319 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the government deprived Ralls of its
constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law).
276. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 38.
277. See, e.g., Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(analyzing the effect of the language of Executive Order No. 13,222 on the court’s
jurisdiction); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451, 455–57 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (interpreting the terms of Executive Order No. 10,988 to preclude judicial
review of the Postmaster General’s decision regarding personnel policy).
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13,873, a flexible enforcement scheme is also important to allow for
compromise with industry partners and to avoid being handcuffed by
rigid language.278 The proposed rule offers a non-exhaustive list of
“Telecommunications and Information Technology Equipment and
Service Providers,” whose standard business operations fall within the
scope of the Executive Order, but the implementing regulations could
provide even more information to affected parties to avoid gratuitous
transaction evaluations.279 For example, the framework could include
licensing requirements to authorize transactions the Executive Order
otherwise prohibits.280 The drafters could establish intermediate
negotiation procedures to allow for risk mitigation and a more malleable
application of the framework to ensure that mitigation, or even
blocking, is appropriate and necessary in the given circumstances.281
Ultimately, as the D.C. Circuit clearly stated in Ralls Corp., affected
parties cannot challenge mitigation measures or blocking orders in
themselves because the executive branch has broad discretion to make
national security decisions; however, this reality does not foreclose
affected parties’ opportunity to challenge the process that the executive

278. The new committee should adopt a similar case-specific approach to that of
CFIUS instead of categorical action. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 8–9. The
merger-specific review that CFIUS conducts has allowed the Administration to achieve
particular policy objectives most efficiently, while also limiting CFIUS’s potentially
unbridled power. See id.
279. Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services
Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,316, 65,318–19 (proposed Nov. 27, 2019) (to be codified
at 15 C.F.R. pt. 7).
280. See Aerospace Industries Association, Comments of Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) to Proposed Rule Entitled “Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,316
(November
27,
2019)
(Jan.
10,
2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2019-0005-0065, at 2 (lobbying for a
licensing capability, similar to those featured in the export control and CFIUS
schemes, to foster a more efficient regulatory framework). For example, in the hospital
hypothetical, there may be a way to block the transmission of patients’ health data back
to the foreign adversary or sever any residual control the manufacturer maintains over
regular use of the cancer treatment machine.
281. See Westbrook, supra note 119, at 660–61, 670 (noting that the President has
officially blocked just five transactions as a result of CFIUS review, and that CFIUS
typically negotiates a compromise with the foreign entity or threatens a negative
recommendation to the President to deter acquisitions that may put national security
at risk).
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branch took to arrive at its conclusions.282 Moreover, implementing
regulations that encourage increased collaboration between the private
sector and executive branch when developing effective mitigation
agreements support transparency, government accountability, and due
process through information-sharing.
2. Create categories of technologies and transactions that correspond to
predicted enforcement responses, similar to CFIUS.
Similar to the use of “critical technologies” in the CFIUS regulations,
providing specific examples of technologies that would likely or
definitely be subject to scrutiny under this new framework would put
key stakeholders on notice and allow them to adjust their businesses
and policies accordingly.283 Establishing a test or set of factors through
the implementing regulations to help key stakeholders understand
which technologies are within the scope of this framework and why
would also further the due process objectives of providing adequate
notice of and access to information that supports the Committee’s
decisions, as well as diminish the likelihood of litigation by bolstering
the capabilities of private parties to self-regulate.284
282. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 311
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
283. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.209 (2019) (defining “critical technologies” as defense
articles or services on the USML, items on the Commerce Control List controlled for
various reasons implicating national security, “[n]uclear facilities, equipment, and
material,” specific chemical “agents and toxins,” and “[e]merging and foundational
technologies”). More than thirty trade associations—representing the electronics,
internet, telecommunications, hospitality, shipping, science, and automotive
industries—worry that foreign ICTS partners, whose collaboration is essential to the
U.S. economy at large, may cease working with American companies without more
clearly defined parameters because perfectly complying with the broad scope of the
proposed rule will be too burdensome. ACT: The App Association et al., MultiAssociation Letter on ICTS Proposed Rule (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.reg
ulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2019-0005-0021, at 2 (“As written, the proposal would
force companies to operate in an environment where all ICTS transactions with
foreign entities could be subject to review, making it more difficult to enter into such
relationships out of fear that they could be suddenly and unexpectedly severed,
eroding trust in U.S. companies, and marking them as unreliable.”).
284. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 105 (“A ‘critical technology’ is most technology that
is controlled on a U.S. export control list . . . . [and] must be: (i) utilized in connection
with the U.S. business’s activity in one or more of targeted industries [and] (ii)
designed by the U.S. business specifically for use in one or more of the targeted
industries.”). Many stakeholders suggested that the final rule should contain
categorical inclusions or exclusions for certain ICTS, transactions, and parties from its
scope. See, e.g., GSMA, Comments of GSMA in the Matter of Securing the Information
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Under FIRRMA, “covered transactions” also include acquisitions of
interests in real estate that are part of U.S. ports or near U.S. military
or government facilities, as well as those that change the rights a
foreign person has relative to a U.S. business and those deliberately
designed to elude CFIUS’s review process.285 Additionally, clarifying
distinctions between “controlling investments” and “other investments,”
like CFIUS does, as well as the difference between active and passive
investors, would alert entities to how pervasively the new Committee
will investigate the funding of subject entities to enforce the Executive
Order.286 For example, if a company knows that a certain percentage
of investment from even a passive investor with a minority stake in the
company will trigger review or mitigation measures under Executive
Order 13,873, that company may prefer to reject that investment
altogether rather than violate the Executive Order and endanger the
property interests on which the company’s business depends.

and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2019-0005-0068, at 16–17 (offering
as a model NDAA § 889, which exempts “transactions for services that connect to the
facilities of a third party . . . and telecommunications equipment that cannot route or
redirect user data traffic or permit visibility into any user data”). But see Huawei
Technologies, Comments of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. and Huawei Technologies
USA, Inc. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-20190005-0018, at 15–16 (arguing against categorical exclusions—in curious alignment
with the Trump Administration—because they discourage supplier diversity and, thus,
threaten cybersecurity, which depends on risk-sharing similar to securitization in the
financial services industry).
285. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1703(4)(C), 132 Stat. 2174, 2177–78. Key stakeholders, including the GSMA
(the global trade association for mobile operators), criticize the proposed rule’s use
of broad terms of art, like “covered transactions,” without a corresponding narrowing
of their scopes in the specific context of Executive Order 13,873. GSMA, supra note
284, at 15. For example, GSMA suggests that covered transactions subject to
enforcement “must have as [their] primary purpose the promotion or expansion of
the ICTS business of a company associated with a foreign adversary,” while
“transactions that involve incidental or derivative use of ICTS by third parties” would
fall beyond the rule’s scope. Id. at 15–16.
286. Westbrook, supra note 119, at 678–79 (footnote omitted) (defining “other
investment” as “a direct or indirect investment by a foreign person in a U.S. business
that does not constitute foreign control, but that affords the foreign person (1) access
to material non-public technical information in possession of the U.S. business; (2)
membership or observer rights on the board of directors, or the right to nominate a
board member, of the U.S. business; or (3) any involvement (other than voting shares)
in the substantive decision making of the U.S. business regarding sensitive personal
data, critical technologies, or critical infrastructure”).
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3. Delegate specific authority to each of the agencies named in the Executive
Order.
The interagency model consisting of both security and non-security
agencies has proven effective in similar contexts, such as CFIUS review
and SDGT designation, to ensure expertise and sensitivity to the
various, discrete issues surrounding the complex challenges related to
critical technologies.287 The new interagency committee should emulate
CFIUS’s structural methods of disciplining its process, particularly
requiring the members to reach a consensus before acting, which
prevents any individual agency from using CFIUS’s authority to take
an extreme position that its peers do not support.288
The new committee should also use Executive Order 13,224 and the
multiagency process for identifying SDGTs as a model.289 Assigning
specific enforcement responsibilities to certain agencies depending on
the transaction at issue and agencies’ respective areas of expertise
would also help private entities establish standing because a clear
committee structure would facilitate identifying the worst actor for
litigation purposes.290 To increase accountability and transparency, the
framework’s implementing regulations should require the executive to
publicly identify the list of entities it defines as “foreign adversaries”
and the reasons for that determination, as the Departments of State

287. Per Ralls Corp., the government should share each agency’s unclassified input
on a given ICTS transaction with the relevant parties or publish it for all private entities
conducting ICTS transactions to review. See 758 F.3d at 319. This action would preempt
the due process violation the government committed in Ralls Corp., and it would make
compliance more intuitive for private entities. See id.
288. Jackson, supra note 126, at 25.
289. See supra Section I.C.3–4 (authorizing the Department of State to designate
persons SDGTs when they pose a direct threat of terrorism, while charging the
Department of the Treasury with the responsibility of designating funders of terrorist
organizations).
290. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (emphasis omitted)
(explaining the importance to standing of a plaintiff’s establishing sustenance of a
“direct” injury “as the result of” a law’s enforcement). The proposed rule mentions the
classified threat and vulnerability assessments that the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security conduct to tailor the
rule to national security concerns pertaining to ICTS, but the proposed rule does not
address the roles and responsibilities of the Committee’s other constituent agencies.
Exec. Order 13,873 § 5(a)–(b), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,691 (May 15, 2019); Securing
the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed.
Reg. 65,316, 65,317 (proposed Nov. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 7).
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and the Treasury do with SDGTs and FTOs.291 Publishing such lists
would explicitly warn all parties against doing business, particularly
ICTS transactions, with publicly designated foreign adversaries to
avoid violating Executive Order 13,873. Providing clear definitions of
terms to facilitate compliance today without sacrificing adaptability for
emerging challenges, designing a committee structure with welldefined roles for each constituent agency, and sharing the utmost
unclassified information with partners in business and foreign governments
would likely resolve the due process issues currently stemming from the
Executive Order.292 Consequently, proactive transparency would also

291. This action should also encompass establishing criteria to identify “persons
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary.” Exec. Order 13,873 § 1(a)(i), 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689, 22,689–90 (May 15,
2019); see James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic & International Studies Comments on
Proposed Rule, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2019-0005-0041, at 2
(“It is the combination of country of origin and sensitivity of application that
determine risk, and the rule would benefit from articulating its approach to risk and
by providing guidelines for companies to make this risk assessment.”). Huawei is an
obvious example as the United States views the company as an arm of the Chinese
government because both its organization and its equipment are likely susceptible to
government-run espionage and hacking. Bensinger & Albergotti, supra note 94.
However, the application of the foreign adversary moniker may be more problematic
in cases where certain entities could be both allies and threats. For example, Israel is
a close economic, political, and military ally of the United States; however, Israel also
ranks as one of the United States’ most capable, aggressive espionage threats. See
Barton Gellman & Greg Miller, “Black Budget” Summary Details U.S. Spy Network’s
Successes, Failures and Objectives, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spynetworks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cddbcdc09410972_story.html (noting that, despite its alliance with the United States,
Israel is one of the Central Intelligence Agency’s top five counterintelligence targets—
along with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba—as a result of Israel’s past espionage
attempts against the United States). Additionally, Israeli companies invest heavily in
information technology, security, and related sensitive industries in the United States.
See Fact Sheet U.S.-Israel Economic Relationship, U.S. EMBASSY IN ISR., https://il.use
mbassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/fact-sheet-u-s-israel-economicrelationship [https://perma.cc/PF7C-6ZT9] (stating that Israeli investment in the
U.S. economy is approaching $24 billion, and that the countries collaborate in myriad
industries, including “IT, bio-tech, life sciences, health care solutions, energy,
pharmaceuticals, food and beverage, defense industries, cyber-security, and aviation”).
292. Related to these issues is the widespread concern among stakeholders that the
new framework is overly broad, and it ignores and is duplicative of a number of existing
regulatory regimes that govern ICTS transactions. See GSMA, supra note 284, at 6–7
(emphasizing the distinct but complementary roles of CFIUS, the EAR, Team
Telecom, the Federal Communications Commission, and NDAA § 889 in promoting
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benefit the executive branch by decreasing the prospects of litigation
and allowing the executive branch to maintain more power to decide
the types of information it wants to disclose without judicial involvement.293
CONCLUSION
In its current form, Executive Order 13,873 gives the federal
government expansive power to interfere with all sorts of private
businesses by granting the enforcement agencies the authority to
subject certain technologies to the Executive Order or label entities as
foreign adversaries even in the absence of an imminent national
security threat when such action is merely a political convenience.
Many of the businesses this Executive Order targets—including
telecommunications, technology, healthcare, and financial services
companies—have never had to consider national security compliance
until now and are, thus, ill-equipped to do so.294 Experts maintain that
bootstrapping national security policy into trade policy should remain
an exceptional tool, reserved for situations that raise honest concerns
regarding the safety and security of the American people.295
Additionally, when national security and trade policy converge, the
government must be clearer about the scope of and rationale for such
multipurpose executive action to limit uncertainty in the U.S. economy
among U.S. trading partners.296
Executive orders are intentionally ambiguous to keep the authority
they grant to the executive branch extremely broad and allow the
executive branch to use its discretion when deciding whether to
intervene in a non-military situation on national security grounds.297
national security by regulating ICTS transactions); Aerospace Industries Association,
supra note 280, at 1; Multi-Association Letter, supra note 283, at 2.
293. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 32 (explaining how transparency
increases the predictability of legal outcomes); supra note 255 and accompanying text.
294. Brown et al., supra note 7.
295. See Zhong, supra note 263 (sharing former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Export Administration Kevin Wolf’s insight that adding Huawei to the Entity List
is “the trade equivalent of a nuclear bomb,” and that previous administrations have
only applied such action in law enforcement and national security contexts, not as a
negotiation tool).
296. See Fuller, supra note 26, at 1458–59, 1463 (raising concerns about the lack of
restraint on the President’s ability to declare a national emergency, and Congress’s
limited oversight authority in such a situation, which extends no further than the
opportunity to terminate a national emergency based on a semiannual review of the
executive branch’s expenditures on a particular national emergency).
297. Id. at 1455, 1459.
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Deliberate vagueness allows the executive to exercise its authority
when it wants and refrain from asserting that authority when other
foreign policy priorities take precedence.298 The executive branch
likely will not enforce Executive Order 13,873 to prohibit technology
transactions within the full scope that the language provides.299
However, as currently written, the Executive Order fails to provide
potential affected parties with a reasonable opportunity to understand
the conduct it prohibits as a whole. Key terms, namely “foreign
adversary,” are poorly defined, which makes complying with the
Executive Order or defending against enforcement difficult because
parties currently have no way of confirming whether their business
activity falls within the scope of the Executive Order before the
government enforces it against them.
Judicial review is the most meaningful and efficient (relative to
congressional action) way that individual litigants can check an abuse
of executive power exercised through quasi-legislative action via
executive order.300 Because courts treat executive orders with the
“force and effect of law,” parties suffering injury as a result of Executive
Order 13,873’s enforcement must have the opportunity to challenge
the Executive Order before an impartial judiciary in accordance with
the separation of powers principle and standing doctrine.301 The
Executive Order does not currently include any express procedural
safeguards that provide affected parties with notice of, access to, and
the opportunity to rebut the unclassified evidence the government
gathers against them. Because the government may use that
information to impose interim mitigation measures or blocking orders
related to questionable ICTS transactions involving foreign adversaries,
the government risks depriving affected parties of their property rights
without due process. Furthermore, these affected parties have standing
to sue the executive branch for due process violations when the
executive branch fails to provide its rationale for enforcing the
298. Id. For example, the executive branch may want to treat a Chinese company
that is attempting to invest in or buy sensitive U.S. technology differently than a
Canadian company taking the same action.
299. Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 40 (arguing that CFIUS review should
interfere with commercial activity only when it is necessary to preserve national
security).
300. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170, 180 (1803) (granting the courts the
power to rule on individual rights and the constitutionality of laws and their
applications).
301. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979).
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Executive Order in specific cases.302 Thus, litigation and the consequential
disclosure of more unclassified information will hopefully help increase
executive transparency and accountability in enforcing Executive
Order 13,873, ultimately lending greater integrity to the executive
branch’s efforts to protect national security through trade policy
without violating due process.303

302. See Newland, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
303. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 117, at 38 (arguing that the mere threat of
judicial review may motivate the executive branch to preemptively ensure that it
complies with due process and does not abuse secrecy in conducting national security
policy to forestall litigation).

